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ABSTRACT
First, the Vietnam Syndrome had a significant cultural impact on the American
public which altered the U.S. public’s collective cultural view of war from an
interventionist to an anti-interventionist stance. Naturally, this shift in public perception
influenced U.S. presidents’ foreign and domestic policy decisions from President Gerald
Ford to President George H.W. Bush. Second, the Vietnam Syndrome’s antiinterventionist effect challenged the established security of containment policy through
military intervention, forcing presidents and their administrations to implement different
rhetorical approaches and messages to unshackle, in their view, America from the antiinterventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome on foreign policy decisions. Third, as a
means to defeat the lasting impacts of the Vietnam Syndrome, the Bush administration
and the U.S. military enhanced U.S. domestic policy through a multi-stage propaganda
and media censorship campaign to rally public, congressional, and international support
for the Persian Gulf War; which, upon America’s victory in the war, established the New
World Order and re-established America’s security abroad.
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Table 1.0

Term List

Term

Definition

American Dualist
Perspective

Exposure of the cognitive dissonance within the American
public, where on one hand, Americans believe in the ideological
principles of Wilsonianism, but on the other, are confronted
with America’s realpolitik enactment of foreign policy.

Cold War
Internationalists

Perceived the Soviet Union as an expansionist power that, under
the guise of peaceful coexistence or détente is lulling the U.S.
into policies that bear a disturbing resemblance to those of
Britain and France during the 1930s.

Containment
Policy

A Cold War foreign policy of the United States and its allies to
prevent the spread of communism after the end of World War II.

Credibility Gap

Any "gap" between an actual situation and what politicians and
government agencies say about it. Describes public skepticism
of administration’s statements and policy.

Culture of War

A “culture of war” is an interlocking system of national
meanings, beliefs, behaviors, institutions, and identities that
consider violence and war necessary and justifiable in the
pursuit of U.S. hegemonic global interests.

Détente

Peaceful coexistence where communications focus on the deescalation of tensions through diplomacy and policy. A popular
foreign policy strategy for post-Vietnam-era presidents due to
the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome.

Interventionist

Favoring intervention, especially by a government in its
domestic economy or by one country in the affairs of another.

Military
Intervention

When the U.S. military is ordered by the sitting U.S. president
to deploy to a region in conflict, either direct or indirectly with
the U.S.

Post-Cold War
Internationalists

Perceive a multi-dimensional game in which the logic of the
situation will ultimately reward cooperation better, and in which
outcomes are often, non-zero sum.

Realpolitik

Real politics that focused on practical objectives rather than
ideological principles like Wilsonianism.
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Semi-Isolationists

Believe that excessively internationalist American policies
threaten America and have squandered resources and attention
away from domestic affairs.

Vietnam
Syndrome

a.) The disinclination of the U.S. public and Congress to engage
or intervene in developing world (third world) conflicts.
b.) An unacceptable restraint on the U.S. government’s ability to
conduct foreign policy in matters of national security interests
abroad.

Vietnamization

Withdrawal of American troops from the Vietnam War

Wilsonianism

A uniquely American political ideology from Woodrow Wilson
based on the rights of self-determination and international
freedom and peace.

x
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INTRODUCTION
“Moscow moreover, is probably genuinely concerned or uncertain about several
developments that seem to have changed the terms of reference in bilateral relations and
could potentially increase the likelihood of hostilities between the United States and the
USSR or constrain opportunities for Soviet political gains abroad. These include… the
end of the “Vietnam syndrome” and readiness of Washington to use force once again in
the Third World, either by supporting insurgencies against the Soviets client regimes-as
in Nicaragua or acting directly - as in Lebanon and Grenada.”
-Directorate of Intelligence, CIA
19831

This quotation by the CIA not only incapsulated the essence of the Vietnam
Syndrome but also solidified the Vietnam Syndrome as a legitimate and measurable
effect that both the United States and the Soviet Union openly recognized by the early
1980s. Similar to the United States and Soviet governments, scholars and academics alike
have recognized the Vietnam Syndrome’s legitimacy and its lasting effects on America.
Building upon the established scholarship, however, this thesis aims to examine and trace
the effects that the Vietnam Syndrome had on the U.S. public, and, in turn, explain how
these effects challenged the ways in which the rhetoric of U.S. presidents and their
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Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Thinking on the Possibility of Armed Confrontation with the United
States, Directorate of Intelligence, December 30, 1983.
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administrations created and implemented foreign and domestic policy decisions during
the post-Vietnam era – decisions which ultimately culminated in President H.W. Bush’s
infamous declaration in 1991 that the Vietnam Syndrome had finally been ‘kicked.’2
While this thesis is focused on determining how the Vietnam Syndrome impacted
the U.S. during the post-Vietnam-era between 1975 and 1991, each chapter will answer
several more specific research questions. It is clear through the historical record that the
Vietnam Syndrome had several distinguishable effects on not only the U.S. public, but
also on foreign and domestic policy decisions between 1975 and 1991. First, the Vietnam
Syndrome had a significant cultural impact on the American public which altered the
U.S. public’s collective cultural view of war from an interventionist to an antiinterventionist stance. Naturally, this shift in public perception influenced U.S.
presidents’ foreign and domestic policy decisions from President Gerald Ford to
President George H.W. Bush. Second, the Vietnam Syndrome’s anti-interventionist effect
challenged the established security of containment policy through military intervention,
forcing presidents and their administrations to implement different rhetorical approaches
and messages to unshackle, in their view, America from the anti-interventionist effects of
the Vietnam Syndrome on foreign policy decisions. Third, as a means to defeat the
lasting impacts of the Vietnam Syndrome, the Bush administration and the U.S. military
enhanced U.S. domestic policy through a multi-stage propaganda and media censorship
campaign to rally public, congressional, and international support for the Persian Gulf
War; which, upon America’s victory in the war, established the New World Order and re-

George H.W. Bush, “Remarks to the American Legislative Exchange Council,” George H.W. Bush
Presidential Library and Museum, March 1, 1991.
2
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established America’s security abroad. In order to fully comprehend the effects of the
Vietnam Syndrome on the U.S. public and foreign and domestic policy decisions during
the post-Vietnam-era, one must first contextualize the mutual understanding between the
U.S. government and its people, that the only way to defeat Soviet communism was
through containment policy.
From the end of World War II until the Persian Gulf War, U.S. foreign and
domestic policy decisions were thought of and created in terms of containment policy,
and containment policy was predicated on the use of American force through military
intervention. Understanding that containment through military intervention was the
context of U.S. foreign and domestic policy decisions during the post-Vietnam era is vital
to recognizing the importance of how the effects of the Vietnam Syndrome altered the
cultural view of war within the American public towards an anti-interventionist posture
within America. This anti-interventionist posture threatened the security of western
democracies by challenging the established strategy of containment policy and military
intervention. That is why presidents and their administrations viewed the Vietnam
Syndrome as something to be defeated or “kicked,” and in order to do so, they used
different rhetorical messages to re-establish America’s faith in its leadership and remove
the shackles of the Vietnam Syndrome on U.S. military intervention.
This shared context is rooted in the containment policy first outlined by former
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, George Kennan. Kennan first mentioned containment
in a famous telegram known as the “Long Telegram” published on February 22, 1946.
Kennan’s telegram to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes was to inform him of the
changes within the Soviet Union in response to western interests. Kennan concluded that
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the Soviet Union and capitalist societies such as the U.S. cannot co-exist, sentiments
which Stalin himself vocalized in 1927. With this conclusion Kennan suggested, among
many things, that,
Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism
is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at
which domestic and foreign policies meets every courageous and incisive measure
to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence,
discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory
over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes.3

By rebranding the global expansion of communism as a plague ravaging the earth,
Kennan suggested that the internal strength and viability of the western world would
determine whether the plague of Soviet communism expansion could be stopped. Over a
year later in 1947, Kennan in his anonymous Mr. X article titled, “The Source of Soviet
Conduct,” published in Foreign Affairs, proposed that the U.S. policy towards Soviet
communist expansion should be focused solely on containment. Kennan defined
containment as, “A long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian
expansive tendencies.”4 Kennan noted however, that “such a policy has nothing to do
with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward
‘toughness.’”5 Kennan’s interpretation of his policy of containment was thereby

3

George Kennan to George Marshall, Moscow, 22 February 1946, in the Charge in the Soviet Union
(Kennan) to the Secretary of State.
4
George Kennan, “The Source of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs (July 1947): 575, http://slantchev.
ucsd.edu/courses/pdf/Kennan%20-%20The%20Sources%20of%20Soviet%20Conduct.pdf
5
Ibid., 575.
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predicated on containing Soviet communist expansion through economic and political
means rather than physical ones. Regardless, Kennan’s containment policy not only
became the backbone of the Truman administration’s foreign policy but was the
preeminent strategy of the U.S. throughout the Cold War. Kennan’s containment policy
came under scrutiny however, dividing the Truman administration on how exactly to
implement containment.
One man in particular, Paul Nitze, who was Kennan’s successor as the Director of
Policy Planning in 1950, interpreted Kennan’s policy in more militaristic terms.
Disregarding Kennan’s concerns with military intervention, Nitze advocated for his more
aggressive interpretation of containment, and his outward show of force garnered more
favor than Kennan’s version of containment which relied more on cultivating internal
strength through economic and political vitality. This is evident by President Truman’s
signing of NSC-68, a document Nitze was instrumental in drafting, which states,
Further, it must envisage the political and economic measures with which
and the military shield behind which the free world can work to frustrate the
Kremlin design by the strategy of the cold war; for every consideration of
devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we
achieve our objectives by the strategy of the cold war, building up our military
strength in order that it may not have to be used.6

“National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National
Security',” April 14, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, US National Archives.
http:// digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116191 (accessed August 5, 2019).
6
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Nitze’s militaristic interpretation of containment policy, however, did not
downplay the economic and political factors that were necessary components to defeat
the Soviet Union. Rather, where Kennan believed that containing Soviet expansion would
best work through ensuring the vitality of the free world and applying political pressure,
Nitze’s interpretation of containment policy pushed for a strong and robust economy and
political system that he deemed necessary in order to support and maintain the might of
the U.S. military. By adopting Nitze’s militaristic interpretation of containment policy,
the U.S. had fully embraced their role as the policeman of the world, ultimately
establishing the need for one leading global power – the United States. Now that the
political atmosphere and context for Cold War America has been established, it is also
important to clarify where this specific argument fits within the historiography of the
Vietnam Syndrome.
Historiography
The historiography of the Vietnam Syndrome spans from the early 1980s through
to the late 1990s. Within the Vietnam Syndrome historiography, works fall into two
specific categories of exploration: cultural/domestic or foreign policy. Throughout the
Vietnam Syndrome’s historiography, categories alternate from publication to publication.
For example, the first to be written on the Vietnam Syndrome, in 1981, pertains to its
cultural or domestic effect. The next publication, in 1984, shifts focus and covers the
effects on foreign policy.
The historiography of the Vietnam Syndrome begins with Michael T. Klare's
book, Beyond the “Vietnam Syndrome:” U.S. Interventionism in the 1980s, published in
1981. Klare’s publication aims to examine, in large part, the cultural and domestic effects

7

of the Vietnam Syndrome. He argues that the Vietnam Syndrome was not an obstacle to
U.S. security because it prevented American intervention in developing countries
conflicts that typically derived from inequality and despotism, fully complying with
America’s historical commitment to self-determination while simultaneously
underscoring the beneficial nature of the Vietnam Syndrome in revealing the risks of
American intervention.7 Klare further argues that the memories of paralysis and despair
that Vietnam created remained strong after the war due to veterans and anti-war activists
that aimed to keep these feelings alive and in the public’s consciousness.
Klare claims that as long as these memories remain in the public’s consciousness,
the U.S. public would remain skeptical of its government’s actions, allowing the Vietnam
Syndrome to continue to discourage military intervention in the developing world. He
writes, “Ultimately, however, the greatest bar to U.S. adventurism abroad is not so much
any of these military factors as the surprising persistence of the Vietnam Syndrome.”8
Moreover, Klare recognizes that the American public would most likely support military
action in order to save the lives of hostages or to protect clear and identifiable objectives
like Persian Gulf oil. He argues that the public would not support an indiscriminate use of
the military to ‘show resolve,’ or as a means to suppress developing world civil disputes
that show no immediate threat to U.S. national security.9 Klare even called for the
American people to maintain the spirit of the Vietnam Syndrome, for it was the surest

Michael T. Klare, Beyond the “Vietnam Syndrome:” U.S. Interventionism in the 1980s (Washington D.C.:
Institute for Policy Studies, 1981): 97.
8
Klare, Beyond the “Vietnam Syndrome,” 13.
9
Ibid., 13.
7
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way to prevent the U.S. from being dragged into another Vietnam ‘quagmire.’ He
encouraged his readers to write to Congress opposing U.S. intervention in El Salvador
since he believed that the restrictive effects of the Vietnam Syndrome would not remain
without consistent reaffirmation of the public’s opposition.10 Klare’s cautionary message,
however, was not heeded as will be explained in chapter two. Klare’s publication
kickstarted the historiography of the Vietnam Syndrome with a call to action for the
American public to maintain their skepticism of those in power.
Contributing to the cultural/domestic category, Arnold R. Isaacs in his book,
Vietnam Shadows: The War, its Ghosts, and its Legacy, published in 1997, set out to
describe the aftermath of the war and its lingering legacy in American politics and
society. Isaacs focused on veterans and social and cultural rifts of the ‘Vietnam
generation,’ the long-lasting impacts on U.S. foreign and military policy, and how
Americans sought to make peace with their enemy and themselves.11 He further argues
that America’s epic victory in WWII in the 1940s compared to the outcome of the ‘bad
war’ in Vietnam left an extraordinary impact on the national spirit. Furthermore, due to
the unprecedented prosperity that the U.S. cultivated at home as well as in military and
economic dominance around the world, Americans came to believe that their success was
guaranteed, and Isaacs claims that this hubris led the U.S. to take its supremacy for
granted.12 The country that had invaded Vietnam in the 1960s, blinded by the memories

10

Ibid., 97.
Arnold R. Isaacs, Vietnam Shadow: The War, Its Ghosts, and Its Legacy (Baltimore, MA: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1997), x.
12
Isaacs, Vietnam Shadow, 7.
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of past victories, had forgotten that it could fail. In his book, Isaacs also addressed the
moral and ethical divisions that impacted American society.
While focusing on both the political and the social effects of the Vietnam War,
Isaacs deviated from others by discussing the consequences of the Vietnam War on
veterans as well as the entire ‘lost generation.’ According to Vietnam veteran, Randy
Russin, the country had essentially already apologized to veterans for the years of hate
and blame. Russin said he had “more or less accepted the apology but uses the analogy of
losing a child, you are different from the experience, you just learn to live in spite of it.”13
Isaacs also comments on the lasting questions that the Vietnam War left unanswered for
the ‘lost generation.’ He states that many avoided the questions: “What is worth fighting
for? When is sacrifice necessary or justified?”14 Those issues and more were churned up
in the political and cultural confusion of the era and arose from an uneasy, skeptical, and
divided nation.15 Rather than focusing on how Americans fought or protested the war,
Isaacs’ work focused on something he believed to be more profound – America’s divisive
opinions regarding the Vietnam War reflected more than anything else, an unfinished
argument about America’s national identity.16
The first publication on the influence of the Vietnam Syndrome on foreign policy
comes from Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau’s book, American Leadership in World
Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus, published in 1984. It aims to examine
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Ibid., 34.
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one specific “aspect of foreign policy – the manner in which individuals occupying
leadership positions in a broad range of public and private institutions perceived and
evaluated that policy during two recent presidential election years, 1976 and 1980.”17
They elaborate further by stating that the “focus here is on how individual leaders
perceive and evaluate international relations and American foreign policy […] the foreign
policy perceptions, beliefs systems, and orientations of American leaders are central to
the role played by the United States in the world.”18 Their book examines the ways which
Americans, especially their leaders, remained extremely divided on fundamental
questions that guided American foreign relations.
Holsti and Rosenau’s study divides American leaders into three independent
groups; Cold War Internationalists, Post-Cold War Internationalists, and SemiIsolationists. The Cold War Internationalists’ viewpoint, is based on the premise of ‘the
present danger’ and the actions that need to be taken to defeat it.19 Where Cold War
Internationalists believe that the global system is like a chessboard with two opponents in
a straightforward contest, Post-Cold War Internationalists view the global arena as a
multi-dimensional game where eventually the logic of the situation rewards those who
cooperate.20 For example, a Post-Cold War Internationalist’s clearest issue between U.S.
and Soviet interests would be in terms of arms control such as SALT and START
treaties.21 Lastly, Semi-Isolationists are described as more concerned with domestic

17

Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of
Consensus (London, England: Boston Allen and Unwin, 1984), xiv.
18
Ibid.
19
Holsti and Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs, 109.
20
Ibid., 116.
21
Ibid., 118.
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problems, believing the threat to the U.S. is largely internal rather than from abroad.
Holsti and Rosenau’s three categories illuminate the points where American leaders
diverged on fundamental questions of U.S. foreign policy in both the 1976 and 1980
presidential elections. Their study arrived at the conclusion that the effects of the
Vietnam War had persisted past the end of the war in 1975, and both of their surveys and
other evidence indicated that the efforts of the past several administrations to establish a
consensus on foreign policy had failed, and no dramatic event had been able to bridge the
divisions that arose from the Vietnam War.22 Following Klare’s interventionists’
perspective, Holsti and Rosenau’s work provided a look at the lack of consensus within
U.S. foreign policy. Departing slightly from the historiography’s trend, Arnold Isaacs
offered a more social perspective of the lasting effects of the Vietnam War on U.S.
policy.
The next foreign policy publication is Geoff Simons’ book, The Vietnam
Syndrome: Impact on US Foreign Policy, published in 1998, which examines the
psychological impact of the Vietnam War on the American populace in relation to
foreign policy. He argues that the “emergence of the Vietnam Syndrome is simple and
straightforward: only in Vietnam did the United States suffer a comprehensive military
and political rout and unprecedented and unrepeatable defeat and humiliation.”23 Simons
elaborates further on his argument by stating that understanding the past to inform the
present is the only way to truly understand the trauma of the Vietnam experience on the
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Holsti and Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs, 249.
Geoff Simons, The Vietnam Syndrome: Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy (London, England: MacMillian
Press LTD, 1998): xvii.
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American psyche.24 Simons, as opposed to Klare and Holsti and Rosenau, takes a more
psychoanalytical than political approach to making sense of the Vietnam Syndrome.
Simons does, however, build directly on Holsti and Rosenau’s argument, citing them
directly to frame the Vietnam Syndrome in both a practical and psychological way. In the
forward to the book, Tony Benn elaborates more on Simons’ balance between foreign
policy and psychology. He states that,
For him, one of the main concerns is the effect of the Vietnam War and
the defeat it brought to America - both on the psychology of the United States and
on the strategic thinking of the policy makers in the Pentagon and the White
House. For the Vietnam Syndrome has played a major role in shifting America
global strategy away from troop involvement to the options of mass
bombardment, terrorism, and sanctions as representing the safest way of
maintaining U.S. hegemony in the modern world.25

Simons argues further that the horrors brought to Vietnam by American power
had little influence in the creation of the Vietnam Syndrome, but rather the “American
defeat, American pain, and American anguish”26 created the syndrome. If the United
States had committed all the horrors it did, but had won the war, there would have been
no Vietnam Syndrome according to Simons.27 Nevertheless, Simons continues to explore
how the American suffering effected global politics.

24

Simons, The Vietnam Syndrome, xviii.
Ibid., xii.
26
Ibid., xx.
27
Ibid.
25

13

Simons placed his argument within the context of America as an imperialistic
society that had committed mass genocide in its imperialistic expansion west. He stated,
“Without considering the early genocide, the racist assumptions, the imperial ambitions,
and the significance of an evolving capitalism - it is impossible to comprehend the full
import for the United States of the Vietnam defeat and humiliation.”28 Simons also
considered the long history of rebellion to western imperial rule throughout Southeast
Asia and the Vietnamese fighting a war at home. He also focused on the point of view of
America’s war abroad, which created massive domestic turmoil. Lastly, Simons
concluded with the profiling of the face of hegemony, outlining how bought politicians
contrived policies to protect and enrich the moneyed elite.29 He went as far to suggest that
the role that money played in the ‘pluto-democracy,’ revealed the principle motive
behind the exercise of U.S. power throughout the world.30 Ultimately, Simons arrived at
the conclusion that a key lesson from Vietnam was how Washington should strive to win
a necessary war by using unconstrained military power – that military as well as ethical
constraints had no place in policies designed to strengthen the U.S. hegemony as the lone
superpower.31
While aspects of Isaacs’ social perspective will be considered, this thesis will
focus more heavily on aspects of Holsti and Rosenau’s three divisions view and Simons’
psychoanalytical slant. Aiming to position itself between the works of Holsti and
Rosenau and Simons, this thesis addresses how presidents and their administrations from

28
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President Ford to President H.W. Bush attempted to create a consensus through varying
rhetorical messages that aimed to defeat the restrictions of the Vietnam Syndrome on
U.S. military intervention. Focusing, as both works do, on the effects of the Vietnam
Syndrome on U.S. foreign policy as well as the psychological trauma that devastated the
American populace. However, this thesis intends to add to the historical narrative by
providing an analysis of U.S. presidents and their administrations’ foreign and domestic
policy rhetoric, and the reflection of their rhetorical messaging in their foreign and
domestic policy decisions – a perspective within the historiography that is currently
lacking.
Each chapter follows its respective research question. Chapter one aims to not
only outline the factors that created the Vietnam Syndrome but also sets out to show how
the Vietnam Syndrome affected the U.S. public by altering its collective cultural view of
war away from the interventionist policy of containment and towards an antiinterventionist agenda. Chapter two, in turn, describes how each post-Vietnam era
president dealt with the effects of the Vietnam Syndrome through deliberate rhetorical
messaging and how each president challenged the Vietnam Syndrome within his rhetoric
as a means to re-alter the cultural view of war within America. Lastly, chapter three
illustrates how President H.W. Bush was able to sell the Persian Gulf War to the U.S.
public, Congress, and the U.N., and re-establish America’s national security abroad, thus
creating for the first time in over a decade a consensus on U.S. foreign policy, effectively
‘kicking’ the Vietnam Syndrome.

15

CHAPTER ONE: THE CREATION OF THE VIETNAM SYNDROME AND ITS
EFFECTS ON THE U.S. PUBLIC
The Vietnam Syndrome was created in large part by the U.S. public’s reaction to
the Vietnam War itself and its government’s response and handling of the war. Factors
including America’s loss of the war, the war’s questionable objectives, its casualty rate,
the widening credibility gap, and the emergence of America’s dualist perspective, all
contributed to the creation of the Vietnam Syndrome, and led to a significant cultural
shift in the American public from favoring an interventionist stance to an antiinterventionist stance. The anti-interventionist stance can best be summarized by the
Vietnam Syndrome’s first definition as America’s disinclination to intervene in
developing worlds’ conflicts, which threatened the established U.S. foreign policy of
containment. The Vietnam Syndrome, however, did not appear overnight. The use of
polling data in the next section helps provide a clear picture of when the Vietnam
Syndrome came about and when its anti-interventionist effects took hold.
Polling Data: Establishing The U.S. Public’s Altered Cultural View Of War
As established in the introduction, U.S. foreign and domestic policy decisions
during the post-Vietnam era were made by policymakers and different presidential
administrations strictly within the parameters of containment through military
intervention. Containment through military intervention was possible because the U.S.
public’s collective cultural view of war supported an interventionist foreign policy. One
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which prided itself on the strength of its military and its members. Moreover, their
interventionist cultural view of war was bolstered by America’s monumental victory
against Nazi Germany in World War II. Rescuing Europe and freeing the western world
from fascism invigorated a tremendous sense of American patriotism, nationalism, and
hubris concerning the U.S. military – an argument provided in Simon Isaacs’ work.
The U.S. interventionist cultural view of war is explained by Anthony J. Marsella
in his article, “The United States of America: ‘A culture of war.’” Marsella argues that
the core of America’s imperial drive is rooted in a historical commitment to the belief of
manifest destiny and American exceptionalism which created a culture of war that
dominates U.S. foreign and domestic policies to this day.32 Furthermore, he defines the
U.S. culture of war as “an interlocking system of national meanings, beliefs, behaviors,
institutions, and identities that consider violence and war necessary and justifiable in the
pursuit of U.S. hegemonic global interests.”33 It is this cultural view of war that drove
U.S. interventionist foreign and domestic policies during the Vietnam War and initially
garnered the support of the U.S. public.
That is why it comes as no surprise that in the early stages of the Vietnam War a
majority of Americans were in favor of and supported military intervention in Vietnam.
In fact, according to a Gallup poll conducted in March of 1966 which posed the question,
“Are you more inclined to agree with the ‘hawks’ or the ‘doves’ (on the issue of fighting
in Vietnam)?,” the results showed that forty-seven percent of Americans agreed with the
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hawks’ mentality, while only twenty six percent agreed with the doves’.34 It is clear from
this poll that the American public’s collective cultural view of war in the early stages of
the Vietnam War was in support of military intervention. However, as the war quickly
started to escalate out of control, domestic support for the war began to alter.
In the same Gallup poll taken in 1966, personal reflection statements from the
poll’s participants were included. Many statements resembled ones like this from a
mother of three living in Ravena, New York, who stated, “It’s a necessary evil. If we
can’t convince these smaller nations that the U.S. is willing to protect their freedom, they
won’t be free for long.”35 However, other statements echoed the sentiments of a
California machinist who said, “We should have followed the example of the French and
never gotten involved with our troops in the first place. A year ago, who would have said
it was going to turn out like this? Well, here we are.”36 The data from the Gallup poll
revealed that by over the span of two years, by August 1968, the views of the California
machinist had grown to become the dominant one within the U.S. For the very first time,
a majority of the American population agreed that their country had made a mistake
entering Vietnam.37 What this Gallup poll proves is that by the summer of 1968, the U.S.
public’s collective interventionist cultural view of war had altered towards a collective
anti-interventionist cultural view of war.
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Further supporting the U.S. public’s altered cultural view of war, another Gallup
poll taken quarterly from August 1965 through November 2000, asked the question “In
view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S.
made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?” The poll results indicate that
between 1968 and 1969, the U.S. public for the first time believed that they should not
have intervened in Vietnam and that it was in fact a mistake intervening in the first place.
Both polls validate that the Vietnam Syndrome had in fact altered the country’s collective
cultural view of war towards that of an anti-interventionist stance.
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Table 1.1

Polling Data
Yes, a mistake

No, not a mistake

No opinion

%

%

%

1971 May 14-17

61

28

11

1971, Jan 8-11

59

31

10

1970 May 21-26

56

36

8

1970 Apr 2-7

51

34

15

1970, Jan 15-20

57

33

10

1969, Sep 17-22

58

32

10

1969, Jan 23-28

52

39

9

1968, Sep 26-Oct 1

54

37

9

1968, Aug 7-12

53

35

12

1968, Apr 4-9

48

40

12

1968, Feb 22-27

49

41

10

1968, Feb 1-6

46

42

12

1967 Dec 7-12

45

46

9

1967 Oct 6-11

46

44

10

1967 Jul 13-18

41

48

11

Date

Source: Gillespie, Mark. “Americans Look Back at Vietnam War” Gallup,
November 17, 2000.
This altered cultural view of war made future U.S. intervention and containment
policy problematic. “The U.S. opinion began to echo anti-interventionist, if not
isolationist, sentiments. The public’s ultimate refusal to support an extension to the U.S.
military action in Vietnam was a powerful reminder to policymakers and the military that
public support was in the end decisive in determining the duration of military
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interventionist foreign policy.”38 Following the same sentiments, in his book, Fighting for
Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, former Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger opens up about the principle lesson he learned from Vietnam. Weinberger
states that,
We could not suddenly explode upon the American people a full-fledged
war and expect to have their support. American public opinion would have to
support such action and would therefore have to be convinced that our national
interests required, indeed demanded, that we go to war. Furthermore, if we did go
to war, this time we would have to do so with all necessary resource and an
unshakable will to win, instead of entering the war as we did in Vietnam: without
any intention or plan to win.39

After Vietnam, Weinberger realized that not only did the U.S. government require
U.S. public opinion to be in favor of going to war, but the American public also needed to
know that it was absolutely vital to their country’s national interest and security. The
prevailing belief that nothing but U.S. military intervention could effectively contain the
spread of communist influence around the world led post-Vietnam era presidents to rely
on different rhetorical messages to challenge and re-alter the collective cultural view of
war back towards an interventionist mindset.
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Factors That Created the Vietnam Syndrome
Fueling the U.S. public’s civil unrest and disinclination to intervene within
developing world conflicts was the loss of belief in the war and the ultimate loss of the
war itself. Officially, the Vietnam War started on November 1, 1955, however, the U.S.
did not intervene or send U.S. military advisors into Vietnam until late 1961. Early on in
the war, many Americans believed that the protection of Vietnam from the invasion of
communist influence was vital to U.S. national security. The U.S. public was also
experiencing the height of McCarthyism and the red scare which allowed for the policy
of ‘Domino Theory,’ a spinoff from containment, to become popular, pulling the U.S.
deeper into Vietnam. For nearly a decade, foreign policy towards Vietnam was based on
assisting the South Vietnamese in their government’s battle against communist influence,
not fighting their battle; however, by the end of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s first term
in office, the Vietnam War began to escalate, pressuring President Johnson to act. From
November of 1963 to August of 1964, he rapidly approved a series of memorandums and
resolutions to combat the rising risk that Vietnam and Southeast Asia posed. These
memorandums included NSAM 273, OPLAN 34A, NSAM 288, and the Tonkin Gulf
resolution.40 President Johnson’s attempt to keep America in a limited-war within
Vietnam failed, and on December 1, 1969 the U.S. Selective Service initiated two draft
lotteries for the war effort. By this time, however, much of the American public had
already become disillusioned with the war and many questioned if their government and
military had any concrete objectives left in Vietnam. Draft dodging, anti-war protests,
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and sit-ins at military recruitment centers all had become common place within the U.S.
by 1969.
Even more upsetting to Americans than the lack of clear objectives was the loss of
the war itself. Up until Vietnam, the U.S. had not suffered a loss in war in the twentieth
century. Representing the winning side in both World War I and World War II and
successfully keeping communist influence out of most of South Korea, the U.S. boasted a
winning military record. After the long drawn out quagmire of Vietnam, however, the
Vietnam Syndrome was able to grow from the U.S. public’s collective pain at
experiencing their first military and political defeat. As Arnold R. Isaacs states,
America’s hubris was taken for granted causing significant trauma to the collective
American psyche.
Further fueling the creation of the Vietnam Syndrome was the American’s
response to the immense casualties that the Vietnam War inflicted on U.S. troops. During
President Johnson’s period of ramping up U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Southeast
Asia, the casualties of the war became a focal point of the U.S. public’s disinclination to
permit interventionist policies. Out of the total casualties of the war numbered at 58,220,
roughly 48,320 were killed in the span of four years, between 1965 and 1969.41 Not only
did this significant loss of life tragically affect the American populace, it prompted two
different presidents to directly address the issue. First, President Johnson called for what
became known as ‘Vietnamization;’ or the withdrawing of American troops from the
war. Just prior to his period of escalating U.S. involvement in Vietnam, on October 21,
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1964, President Johnson gave his remarks in the Memorial Hall at Akron University
where he famously stated, “We are not about to send American boys 9 to 10,000 miles
away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.”42 These
remarks turned out to be hollow, however, with the continued deployment of troops to
Vietnam for the duration of the war, and despite America’s continued protest of the war
and draft.
Next, President Richard Nixon attempted to ease the U.S. public’s mind about the
casualties of the war with a renewed message for ‘Vietnamization.’ Nixon stated, “In the
previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we
are Vietnamizing the search for peace.”43 President Nixon knew that the country was not
only deeply divided over the continuation of the war, but was also fully aware of the
continued effects of the widening credibility gap that also contributed significantly to the
creation of the Vietnam Syndrome. President Nixon directly declared in his opening
statements of his speech, “I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about
Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told
them about our policy.”44 President Nixon’s plan to ‘Vietnamize’ the war was a direct
attempt to bridge the credibility gap and calm protests over casualties by reducing troop
deployments and establishing a scheduled withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. By being
clear about his and his administration’s plan and objectives, Nixon believed that the U.S.
public would support his Vietnam policy instead of protesting it. While both President
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Johnson and Nixon tried to address the country’s issue with an objectiveless and bloody
war, neither president could effectively bridge the growing credibility gap.
The loss of support for the war and belief in its objectives due largely to the high
casualty rates were significant factors in the creation of the Vietnam Syndrome since they
fueled the American public’s drive for withdrawal from not only Vietnam, but all
developing world conflicts. However, the widening credibility gap and the lack of trust
that the American people had in their government helped create the Vietnam Syndrome,
as well as sustain its lasting effects for the next decade and a half. Understanding that the
credibility gap did not arise from one single event, it is only appropriate to list the many
events and instances that led to the creation of the credibility gap. *Note this is not an
exhaustive list.
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Table 1.2

Events That Widened The Credibility Gap

Date

Event

Sept. 1954 - June 1977

The failure of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization.

Jan. 1964

Tonkin Gulf, Plan 34A, and Operation DESOTO.

Apr. 17, 1964

Paul Potter’s Incredible War speech.

Sep. 19, 1964

Start of the Free Speech and Anti-War Movements.

Dec. 2, 1964

Mario Savio’s Sproul Hall speech at the University of California
Berkley.

Nov. 6, 1966

President Johnson’s canceled multi-state political tour.

Jan. 1968

The Tet Offensive.

Feb. 1968

Photo of National Police Chief Nguyen Ngoc Loan shooting a
detained Vietcong member.

Feb. 1968

Walter Cronkite’s Stalemate report.

Mar. 1, 1968

President Johnson announces that he will not seek re-election.

June. 7, 1972

Watergate

June 8, 1972

The Terror of War photos by Nick Ut.

Feb. 1973

War Power Act

Lastly, factoring into the creation of the Vietnam Syndrome was the U.S. public’s
realization of their own cognitive dissonance in the form of the American dualist
perspective. The American dualist perspective is made up of two opposing concepts:
America’s belief in the ideological principles of Wilsonianism, and the reality of
America’s realpolitik enactment of foreign policy.45 When the Terror of War photos
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taken by Nick Ut were published in 1972, Americans were exposed to horrific images of
Vietnamese children fleeing from a napalm bombing. These images challenged the notion
that the U.S. represented the collective security of the free world established under
Wilsonianism,46 as well as the international rule of law and the protection of international
human rights established under the U.N. with the signing of the Atlantic Charter on
August 14, 1941.47 The rhetoric of Wilsonianism, coupled with the U.S. leading the U.N.
in its commitment to international law and human rights,48 created a climate within
America best described by former Under Secretary of State George Ball as, “the public
wants sentimental tears with its politics.”49 Perceiving their government as being
dishonest at best and consciously lying to them at worst, the U.S. public believed there to
be nothing just or humane about what had occurred during the war. Once the American
populace confronted the reality of the consequences of war, they recognized their
collective cognitive dissonance unique to the American dualist perspective and responded
to it by continuing to call for more withdrawal of U.S. activities abroad, feeding into the
anti-interventionist narrative of the Vietnam Syndrome.
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The Vietnam Syndrome and the U.S. Public’s Cultural Shift Towards War
Following the conclusion of WWI, the U.S. entered a drastically new cultural
reality. The period known as the roaring twenties, a time for flappers and bootleggers,
was a clear indicator of a society and culture in rebellion and accompanied America’s
adoption of an isolationist stance within its foreign policy. Unwilling to get mixed into
the affairs of Europe and choosing to focus inward instead on domestic issues, became
the focal point of U.S. politics until the event of December 7, 1941, which drew the U.S.
back into the global arena. The U.S rose to become one of the only superpowers after the
war and encouraged western democracy as the ideal political ideology. This mindset led
the U.S. into the Cold War where containment policy was established as the default
foreign policy stance aimed at defeating Soviet communism. Containment policy drove
the decisions to enact war first in Korea in the 1950s and then Vietnam in the 1960s. The
creation of the credibility gap and the Vietnam Syndrome on the psyches of Americans,
combined with the devastating loss of the Vietnam War, however, challenged this policy,
and similar to the isolationist aftermath of WWI, the Vietnam War and the Vietnam
Syndrome altered the collective cultural view of war within the American public towards
favoring an anti-interventionist foreign policy agenda.
Discussing the U.S. public’s change in the collective cultural view of war, Geoff
Simons examined the core trauma that the Vietnam Syndrome had on America. Simons
argues that the psychiatry of the Vietnam Syndrome was one of paranoia, shock, amnesia,
and emotional collapse, described as a national state rather than a specific state of some
individuals.50 Simons’ work established that the Vietnam Syndrome took a significant toll
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on America’s collective consciousness rather than just individuals. This is an important
distinction to make because he claims that the impact of the Vietnam Syndrome on
presidents and their administrations was achieved by a collective effect rather than a
singular one on the part of individuals or local groups. The collective pressure from the
U.S. public for an anti-interventionist agenda heavily restricted the ability of presidents
and their administrations, most notably those of Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush, to
conduct foreign policy by force, and from their perspectives, unable to defend vital
national security interests abroad.
One consequence of the Vietnam War, Simons argues, was the creation of a
significant psychiatric impairment within the American public caused by the loss of the
war similar to a traumatized individual throwing oneself into exile.51 The trauma that they
perceived left a significant lasting impact that seemed to be branded into the national
consciousness. Simons quotes “an inability to forget, a resistance to the everyday
workings of historical amnesia, despite the serious and coordinated efforts of the
government and much of the press to ‘heal the wounds’ of the war by encouraging such
forgetting.”52 The fact that the U.S. public maintained the memory of the horrors of the
war enabled the Vietnam Syndrome to continue influencing their longing for an antiinterventionist stance and the country’s collective cultural view of war continued to favor
anti-interventionism throughout the early to mid-1970s. Even after President Nixon
proclaimed that there would be ‘no more Vietnams,’ Americans continued to show
significant reservations towards U.S. military intervention. 53 They showed such distaste
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for intervention that many began to speculate if the U.S. government would ever
successfully use military intervention again. President Nixon stated that America’s
defeat in Vietnam “turned us into a military giant and a diplomatic dwarf in the world in
which the steadfast exercise of American power was needed more than ever before”54
When viewing the effects of the Vietnam Syndrome in such terms, it is clear why many
presidents and their administrations considered it as something that needed to be defeated
if containment policy was to be successful. As America’s cultural shift regarding war
continued to spread throughout the masses, those in power began to notice the rifts in
popular consensus towards containment policy.
While their study focuses primarily on the lack of agreement within the leadership
of the U.S. government in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Holsti and Rosenau also
examine the domestic constraints of the Vietnam War and its impact on American
society. According to Holsti and Rosenau's research, some policymakers within the U.S.
government began to blame Congressional interference as the sole failing attribute of the
war. These policymakers, in turn, subscribed to the Vietnam Syndrome’s secondary
definition as an unnecessary restraint on U.S. foreign policy. Holsti and Rosenau
continue to argue that others have linked the loss in Vietnam to general domestic
divisions which ultimately eroded the U.S. ability to successfully win the war.55 One
example that Holsti and Rosenau discuss is the controversial relationship between the
media and domestic support for the war. They argue that differing perspectives amongst
policymakers varied between viewing the media as the only source for factual evidence
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of the Vietnam War to the U.S public suspiciously viewing a historically deceptive U.S.
government that insisted an end to the war was near. Views that the media contributed to
the American defeat due to their broadcasted sensationalism and atrocious distortion of
key events of the war led some in power, such as Henry Kissinger, to argue for media
censorship since they considered the Vietnam War defeat to be a domestic conflict.56
Holsti and Rosenau’s research indicates that 69 percent of policymakers during the 1976
presidential year felt that the U.S. public’s discontent with the war was driven by
sensationalist media coverage of the war and 66 percent of them believed that pressure
from domestic dissidents was a significant constraint on the U.S.57 Many also believed
that the media was the only source of truth for the American people. This research is
significant to the creation of the Vietnam Syndrome and its effects on the America
because it shows that as early as 1976, policymakers were aware of the domestic
constraints created by public dissidents and the media about the war which was impacting
traditional foreign policy.
Furthermore, Holsti and Rosenau point out that there were deep divisions in
Congress, the media, and within American society and these divisions suggest that there
were a significant number of policymakers who agreed that these domestic issues were a
source of failure in Vietnam. Holsti and Rosenau’s data supports the argument that those
who championed a military victory in Vietnam were more willing to attribute domestic
constraints to the loss of the war, whereas those who favored immediate withdrawal from
Vietnam were less inclined to cite domestic issues.58 In other words, policymakers who
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favored a complete withdrawal from the war, according to the data, would be more
inclined to focus on the negative domestic consequences of the war than the ones who
favored a military victory.59 As stated previously in the historiography, Holsti and
Rosenau identified Semi-Isolationists as one of the conflicting groups of leaders who
challenged U.S leadership. The emergence of the Semi-Isolationists encapsulated the
shift in the U.S. public’s collective cultural view of war.
Another lens through which to examine how the Vietnam War and the Vietnam
Syndrome altered the U.S. public’s collective cultural view of war is through the group
that fueled the Vietnam Syndrome and in some opinions the loss of the Vietnam War –
the media. The term Vietnam Syndrome become more popularly used within the media
during three specific time periods. First in the mid-1970s, then in the early to mid-1980s,
and lastly from 1991-1992. Each grouping correlates to events that occurred during each
time period. Even though this thesis aims to examine the Vietnam Syndrome from its two
distinct political definitions, it is important to note that the media first framed the
Vietnam Syndrome in psychiatric terms. For example, one of the first times the Vietnam
Syndrome was used within the media is in Eleanor Hoover’s article, “Veterans Having
Adjustments Woes,” published in the Los Angeles Times in 1976. Hoover’s article was a
response to the tens of thousands of Vietnam veterans re-entering civilian life. She
mentioned the ‘post-Vietnam Syndrome’ as a concept that was first expressed by a New
York Psychologist by the name of Chaim Shatan in 1972.60 According to Shatan, “good
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Americans are turned into mass executioners as a result of the modern military training
[…] the result being the unconsummated grief on the part of many soldiers which
deprives them of any meaning in their current existence.”61 It is quite telling that one of
the first times the Vietnam Syndrome was used in the media was in a psychological
context. Hoover used the term in reference to veterans, however, veterans are American
citizens reintroduced to society so despite their past identity as military personnel they
are also counted among the collective U.S. public. This is significant because of the
impact that the veteran’s anti-war movement had on the rise of the Vietnam Syndrome. It
would not be a reach to claim that anti-war veterans played a significant role in altering
the U.S. public’s collective cultural view of war away from interventionism and towards
an anti-interventionist position, as will be discussed later in this chapter through postVietnam era films.62
The next group of articles where the media began discussing the Vietnam
Syndrome is at the beginning of the 1980s. Published in 1981, a Los Angeles Times
excerpt titled, “Another War? Food for Thought” discussed President Reagan’s
comments on the developments in El Salvador. President Reagan was quoted saying that
any actions of his would be limited as “part of the Vietnam Syndrome [even though he
claimed that] we have no intentions of that kind of involvement.”63 Opposing President
Reagan’s sentiments, the author notes that within the “White House press room […]
humor cracked that in 10 years we’ll have 60,000 American casualties and 50 El
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Salvadorian restaurants in Arlington.”64 Outside of the racist implications, this particular
article revealed the high level of skepticism that the public held towards the Reagan
administration’s ability to restrain itself and keep the U.S. out of another foreign
quagmire. This article further exposed the effects of the Vietnam Syndrome that flared up
when President Reagan and his administration began to step up U.S. intervention in El
Salvador – a topic that will be explored in depth in chapter two. Continuing to make
news, the Vietnam Syndrome was mentioned once again in connection with veterans, this
time linking memories of the Vietnam War to renewed feelings of isolationism.
In the article, “Remembering Veterans, Forgetting a War,” published in the Los
Angeles Times in June of 1981, Philip Geyelin commented on how the poor attendance
rate at the National Vietnam Veterans Memorial Day Service, a mere 50 seats filled of
the 500 chairs set up, mirrored the national mood.65 Geyelin directly referred to the
Vietnam Syndrome by remarking on “the conventional wisdom [of] the mood of
America, in general, and about public attitudes toward war and peace (the so-called
Vietnam syndrome) in particular.”66 Moreover, Geyelin criticized the chosen speaker for
the service, Ellsworth Bunker, the former U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, for
embodying the establishment while Vietnam veterans were for the most part antiestablishment. However, Geyelin did credit Bunker’s ability to remain sensitive to the
perils of the war while still supporting the war’s original intent. Geyelin quotes Bunker as
saying “a war new to American experience […] conventional and guerilla […] political
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and psychological […] limited by restraints we imposed upon ourselves.”67 In closing,
Geyelin observed how the choice words vocalized and those withheld from the service
emulated how the country felt about itself and its role in the world nearly a decade after
the trauma of Vietnam.68 Continuing to frame the Vietnam Syndrome within a
psychological context, while also capturing a nation battling to respect those who lost the
war while simultaneously erasing the mistakes of the past, Geyelin provides a clear view
of how the Vietnam Syndrome impacted the national mood.
In his article, “Public’s Attention Returns to Issues of War and Peace,” published
in the Los Angeles Times in 1983, Doyle McManus shifted the conversation back towards
America’s push for isolationism and highlighted the U.S. public’s realization of their
unique American dualist perspective. He argues that the post-Vietnam polls revealed an
American majority looking inward towards domestic affairs rather than the next foreign
adventure financed by increased defense spending.69 In his work, McManus states that
the Vietnam Syndrome had endured due to America’s reticence towards U.S. intervention
in regional and global conflicts, and many Americans, he claims, are increasingly
skeptical of presidential claims that the regional and global conflicts are vital to U.S.
security.70 McManus adhered to the media's recent historic trend by reiterating the lasting
effects of the Vietnam Syndrome on the American public’s collective cultural view of
war towards an isolationist stance. He highlighted America’s realization of their unique
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dualism by stating that "The U.S. public's view of the world has rested on these two
contradictory impulses ever since World War II: Americans want the United States to be
respected as the strongest nation on earth and, at the same time, they want to avoid any
involvement in war."71 By not only providing evidence of the continued effect of the
Vietnam Syndrome on America’s collective cultural view of war but by also examining
the U.S. public’s realization of their uniquely American dualist perspective, McManus
established the legitimacy of the Vietnam Syndrome. The last cluster of articles
demonstrating the media’s return to the Vietnam Syndrome began in March of 1991,
mere months after the initiation of Operation Desert Storm.
Two articles referring to the Vietnam Syndrome were published in the Los
Angeles Times just days apart from one other on March 8th and March 11th of 1991. The
first of these two articles, titled “Not So Fast into the Iraq Syndrome," written by Todd
Gitlin, harkened back to the source of the Vietnam Syndrome when he suggested that
instead of an Iraq Syndrome, why not just have no more Iraq's? He clarified his position
by stating "Meaning, no more tilts towards dictators of choice, no more reliance on gun
sales as Americans-or anyone else’s […] finally, no more fantasies that Patriots and
Tomahawks can save us from the sins of appeasement.”72 Gitlin’s position in 1991 is a
direct response to the aggressive major military interventionism in the Gulf as well as a
criticism of how the Reagan and Bush administrations conducted business under the
limitations of the Vietnam Syndrome. Gitlin solidified his point further by stating,
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The so-called Vietnam Syndrome-so named President Reagan as if it were
a disease was always more a disposition than a position: a disposition against war
as an extension of foreign policy. This was no simple mood, but a compound of
moral and practical assessments. The moral feeling was that America wasn't
entitled to throw its weight around the world, the practical was that America
shouldn't enter wars it couldn't win.73

Gitlin claims that President Reagan believed that the Vietnam Syndrome was a
disease and as such, in need of eradication. President Reagan and President H.W. Bush
both gave the impression that the Vietnam Syndrome needed to be eradicated because it
all but eliminated intervention as a fundamental part of the foreign policy which
ultimately undercut their ability to contain Soviet expansion via containment policy.
From Gitlin’s point of view, it appears that the Vietnam Syndrome had continued to
linger into the 1990s. The next article, however, depicts a weakening of the Vietnam
Syndrome since the U.S. had appeared to have forgotten its lessons from the war.
In his article, “Unlimited Violence Wins Out,” Alexander Cockburn
argues that despite President H.W. Bush’s praise of the U.S. military’s swift action in the
Gulf, if the American public were to know the extent of the killing ordered by President
H.W. Bush, he could never have claimed that the country had put the Vietnam Syndrome
behind itself.74 Cockburn argues that the real message to understand from the action in
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the Gulf is that the lessons of Vietnam have now been unlearned and what pays most is
the exercise of violence without limit, instead of believing the claim that the Vietnam
Syndrome was beaten.75 The significance of Cockburn’s argument is that he recognized
the initiation of Operation Desert Storm as a return to major U.S. military intervention,
yet in doing so, failed to prevent the massacre of Kurds in the north and Sunni in the
northwest by their neighbor, Iraq. Similar to Klare, Cockburn took a humanist approach
by requesting his readers to take action regarding these violent issues; specifically, by
sending money to the International Committee of the Red Cross labeled for the victims of
the Gulf War.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the first cluster of reports about the Vietnam
Syndrome by the media immediately associated the Vietnam Syndrome with psychiatric
terms. The second cluster of articles published in the early 1980s represented a response
to the heightened fear of potential further intervention in Central America and the Middle
East and revealed the U.S. public’s favor of adopting an isolationist view towards foreign
policy. The articles of the 1980s also demonstrated the effects of the Vietnam Syndrome
in altering America’s collective cultural view of war as a fundamental part of U.S.
foreign policy. The third and final cluster of articles emerged as a response to the
beginning of the Persian Gulf War and focused on the discussion of whether or not the
Vietnam Syndrome had been ‘kicked’ from the U.S. public’s collective memory after the
success of the Persian Gulf War. Derived from the representation of the Vietnam
Syndrome within the media, it is evident that the country’s collective cultural view of war
had been altered to favor an anti-interventionist stance in policy; and, in an effort to
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reverse the effects of the Vietnam Syndrome on the U.S public, the government and
Hollywood worked together to rewrite the script of the Vietnam War.
Interest Groups and the U.S. Public
Similar to the breakdown in consensus amongst Congress members on how to
best conduct foreign policy during the post-Vietnam era, there was a similar lack of
consensus within the U.S. public on how to respond to the Vietnam War. The media, for
the most part, followed the majority of the U.S. public’s view in representing the
Vietnam Syndrome as a necessary restriction on U.S. foreign policy that prevented the
U.S. from implementing interventionist strategies within foreign countries that could
draw the U.S. into another quagmire. However, there were other interest groups that
followed a different narrative. For example, religious communities throughout America
differed in how they responded to the Vietnam War and the Vietnam Syndrome.
Grasping how these different interest groups responded to the Vietnam War is vital
because it is these different interest groups that were later on persuaded by the different
rhetorical message of presidential administrations to shift the culture of war back towards
intervention.
Interest groups like religious organizations were especially susceptible to
presidential rhetoric due to the good versus evil narrative that surrounded the Cold War –
notably, that America was on the side of God, doing God’s work to rid the world of the
atheistic evils of Communism. According to Jill K. Gill’s article “Religious Communities
and the Vietnam War,” most religious communities fell into four distinct camps when
referring to the Vietnam War. The first of the religious groups can be referred to as
religious crusaders, who deemed the war as good and urged all necessary means to ensure
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victory. They viewed the Vietnam War in large part as a spiritual crusade against Satan’s
scheme to control the world. The second camp, the religious nationalists, supported
America’s Vietnam policy, especially when presidents asked them to, but contrary to the
religious crusaders, were not as militaristic and did not demand that the war be won at all
costs. The third religious camp, religious dissenters, viewed the policies implemented
during the war as misguided, unjust, and immoral, similar to the sentiments of the
majority of the U.S. public. Lastly, the fourth camp, the pacifists, viewed all war as
ungodly and mirrored similar sentiments as the religious dissenters.76 Due to the
differences in religious interpretations of the war, presidents and their administration
were able to capitalize on these specific groups and gain traction against the antiinterventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome.
As the Cold War began to heat up in the late 1970s through the early 1980s,
tough-on-communism rhetoric influenced a boom in neoconservative religious camps
such as religious nationals, which became a foundation of the Republican Party.
According to Gill,
When Ronald Reagan became president in 1980, in part by wooing
religious nationalist voters, he helped resurrect and confirm the crusaders’
explanations for the war’s failure. Along with bitter generals such as
Westmoreland, Reagan implied that America could have won had the military’s
hands been untied by the weak-kneed politicians who lacked the will to stay the
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course. He also demonized dissenters as traitorous and the media as sellouts.
These interpretations, which ignored historical evidence, have become
mainstream in part because religious nationalists adopted them, too.77
By capitalizing on the divisiveness of religious camps over the Vietnam War,
presidents such as Reagan, were able to convince the rising number of neoconservative
voters, especially conservative evangelicals, to support a more interventionist approach
towards American foreign policy. In fact, towards the end of Reagan’s presidency in
1988, religious conservative Jerry Falwell, founder of Moral Majority, told the press that,
“Ronald Reagan saved the country.”78 By understanding that even though the majority of
the U.S. public’s view of the Vietnam War and the Vietnam Syndrome mirrored the
media’s, there was, like in Congress, a lack of consensus amongst varying interests
groups that allowed, as will be explored in chapter two, presidents and their
administrations to use different rhetorical messages to shift the U.S. public’s culture of
war back towards a policy of intervention.
The Vietnam Syndrome And Popular Culture: Rewriting The Script Of The
Vietnam War
A subtle way the effects of the Vietnam Syndrome on America can be observed is
through the plethora of films about the Vietnam War that were produced during the postVietnam era from 1975-1991. One first notes the quantity of war movies produced, and
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second, recognizes the distinction between the realist and revisionist portrayals of the
Vietnam War, which can be perceived as a reflection of how the U.S. public and
government reacted to the lasting legacy of the Vietnam War over time. As part of his
objective to eradicate the Vietnam Syndrome, President Reagan sought to capitalize on
Hollywood's dual narrative by endorsing revisionist narrative movies such as Rambo, as a
means to try and rewrite the script of the Vietnam War and sway public opinion. By
examining the significant number of movies that were produced during the post-Vietnam
era, it is evident that America had not quite forgotten the trauma of Vietnam.
The well-known saying, ‘art reflects culture,’ resonates in the case of postVietnam era movies. During the post-Vietnam era, at least twenty-four movies were
produced that centered on the Vietnam War.79 This figure equates to 1.5 movies per year
that were produced from 1975 to 1991. The production of nearly two movies per year for
over a decade and a half is an indicator of a society consumed with the lasting narrative
of the Vietnam War and represents a culture unwilling to forget their failure in Vietnam.
Not only were there a significant number of movies produced during the post-Vietnam
War era, but many of these movies continued to significantly influence the U.S. public
well after the post-Vietnam era. Mirroring the division in Congress, as well as society,
Hollywood reflected the interventionist vs. anti-interventionist narrative by making
movies that either followed a revisionist narrative or a realist narrative of the war. Movies
like Apocalypse Now (1979), Platoon (1986), Full Metal Jacket (1987), and Born On the
4th of July (1989) followed the realist narrative, whereas movies such as the Rambo
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trilogy (1982, 1985, 1988), Missing in Action (1984, 1985, 1988), and White Ghost
(1988) represented the revisionist narrative. Unlike the realist narrative, which tried to
capture the true feelings, emotions, and trauma of the Vietnam War on film, the
revisionist narrative sought to reshape the narrative of the Vietnam War into the way the
U.S. thought it should have played out. These post-Vietnam era movies illustrated the
division between the U.S. public’s anti-interventionist position and the U.S.
government’s interventionist strategy of containment.
Realist Narrative
Following the realist narrative, movies such as Apocalypse Now, Platoon, and
Full Metal Jacket represent the reality of the Vietnam War and help explain why the U.S.
public adopted a more anti-interventionist position during the post-Vietnam era.
Apocalypse Now, starring Hollywood super-stars Martin Sheen, Marlon Brando, and
Robert Duvall, was the first of the realist narrative movies to largely impact the American
populace. Released on August 2, 1979, the blockbuster depicts a senseless war without
tangible goals or objectives. The plot follows Martin Sheen’s character, Captain Willard,
on a mission upriver to assassinate an AWOL decorated colonel. On his travels, Willard
witnesses the mass bombing of villages and listens to Duvall’s character, Lt. Colonel
Kilgore, utter the iconic line, “I love the smell of Napalm in the morning.”80 Willard
recognizes the growing credibility gap when he remarks, “The war is being run by a
bunch of four-star clowns who were going to end up giving the circus away.”81 These
sentiments were not just a reflection of the soldiers on the front lines, but were a
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reflection of the U.S. public’s perception of how their government had handled the war.
Apocalypse Now reflects the realist narrative mostly through the portrayal of Brando’s
character, Colonel Walter E. Kurtz, the AWOL colonel who had abandoned his post. In a
speech to an imprisoned Willard, Kurtz relayed a particular horror the Vietnam War had
wrought when he recalled returning to a village where he had just inoculated children and
describes how “they had […] hacked off every inoculated arm. There they were in a pile.
A pile of little arms. And I remember...I...I cried. I wept like some grandmother. I wanted
to tear my teeth out.”82 This type of raw imagery that the realist narrative offered
resonated with America; the pain and regret played out on screen validated the emotions
that fueled America’s disinclination towards intervention.
Furthering Hollywood’s realist narrative, Platoon, released on December 24,
1986, portrayed the emotions of the American soldier during the Vietnam War, and
highlighted the divide between the volunteers and those who were drafted. Early in the
film, Charlie Sheen’s character, Chris Taylor, felt, as many did early in the war, that he
would “Do his fair share for his country. Live up to what my grandpa did in the first war,
and dad did in the second.”83 His sense of obligation faded the longer he spent in the
jungle, however, as he began to realize how the war was becoming more inhuman and
lawless. In sweeping through a village, Tom Berenger’s character, Sergeant Barnes, kills
an innocent civilian woman in cold blood and then proceeded to take a man’s child at gun
point in order to make the man admit they were Vietcong members.84 Willem Dafoe’s
character, Sergeant Elias, stepped in to hold Sergeant Barnes accountable for his actions
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and threatened that an investigation would prove his unauthorized killings. Shortly after
their altercation, Sergeant Barnes ordered the village to be burned, an act that was
commonly practiced during the Vietnam War.85 After viewing the raw violence and
psychological torment of the Vietnam War on film, notably the inhumane acts that were
uncomfortably grounded in reality, it comes as no surprise that a U.S. public that had
been taught to believe that America represented law, justice, freedom, and
humanitarianism would lean towards an anti-interventionist posture in terms of U.S.
foreign policy.
Full Metal Jacket, released on June 26, 1987, took a slightly different approach to
portraying the realist narrative that also significantly impacted the general public.
Providing comic relief in the over-dramatization of boot camp, Full Metal Jacket
deviated from the hard-hitting imagery in earlier films. Focusing more on the media
portrayal of the war, the movie follows Matthew Modine’s character, Private Joker, and
his camera man, Rafterman, played by Kevyn Major Howard, for the military newspaper,
Stars and Stripes. What Private Joker discovers instead is that the military has been spindoctoring propaganda pieces about the war and covering up the fact that soldiers have
been killing entire villages seemingly without remorse; in one scene, Private Joker
reports the mass killing of nearly twenty villagers dumped in a mass grave covered in
lime.86 He also interviews other soldiers about their feelings on the war and several
soldiers admitted to having serious questions about the war, with one soldier even
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quoting President Johnson’s famous ‘Vietnamization’ reference to encapsulate his
feelings.87 Towards the end of the film, Full Metal Jacket, depicts the raw violence and
psychological trauma similar to previous realist narrative films, including the scene in
which Private Joker made the decision to kill the sniper who had already killed three
members of their squad and was bleeding to death.88 Realist narratives such as Full Metal
Jacket offered realistic images of combat while stripping away the usually censored
representation of Hollywood's portrayal of warfare in combat movies, making their
effects on the U.S. public even more persuasive.89 Bringing the realist narrative home,
Hollywood moved from the realist portrayal of the battlefield to the reality of life as an
injured veteran returned home from a war that society wished to forget.
Bringing more fame and notoriety to the realist narrative, Tom Cruise starred in
the biographical film Born On the 4th of July, released to theaters on December 20th,
1989. Cruise plays Ron Kovic a quadriplegic former Marine of the Vietnam War. Born
On the 4th of July depicts Ron’s journey from being a Marine, to becoming handicapped,
turning to protest, and ultimately becoming an activist. His journey begins as a young boy
in high school where he uses his family connection to the military as his reason to
volunteer for Vietnam. Kovic states, “What’s the matter with you anyway? You served,
Uncle Bob served, don’t you remember what President Kennedy said? There is not going
to be an America anymore unless there are people willing to sacrifice. I love my country,
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dad.”90 To which his mom replies, “You are doing the right thing Ronnie. Communism
has to be stopped. It’s God’s will you go.”91 Shortly afterwards, Kovic is deployed to
Vietnam where he and his platoon raid a village but are ambushed. When forced to
retreat, and using the villagers as cover, Kovic, in the chaos and confusion of battle,
accidently killed a fellow retreating Marine. He reports what he had done in shock and is
told to report back to his station.
Jumping to January of 1968, Kovic and his platoon are once again ambushed near
a village but this time Kovic is shot in the ankle. Unable to move, Kovic tries to stay and
fight but is overwhelmed. Shot in the right chest, Kovic is rescued by a fellow Marine
and medevacked to a medical tent where he is read his last rights. Kovic is saved
however, and ends up in a poorly funded, rat infested, Veterans Affairs hospital in the
Bronx, New York. He was poorly treated and forced to not only live in his own feces for
days due to lack of care, but would often go days without food or water as well.92
Watching on T.V. as the protests turn from anti-war to anti-military, Kovic and other
veterans began to see once they returned home how negatively everyone felt about the
war in Vietnam. Kovic realizes that he is not alone in his transformation from a patriotic
and God-fearing soldier to a disabled veteran to ultimately realizing that he had
committed numerous human rights violations during his stint as soldier. Instead of
allowing those within Congress and the U.S public to demonize Vietnam veterans, Kovic
advocated for their help and support though anti-war protests. Concluding the film, Kovic
prepares to address the nation at the 1976 Democratic National Convention in New York
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City bringing Veterans Affairs to the forefront of political debate. Born On the 4th of July
not only follows the realist narrative through its depictions of the horrors and
consequences of the Vietnam War, but also focuses on the reality and perspective of the
veteran. Nevertheless, just as major Hollywood actors portrayed the realist narrative
screen, just as many star-studded casts represented the revisionist narrative of the
Vietnam War.
Revisionist Narrative
Counteracting the realist narrative, the revisionist narrative within Hollywood
grew out of the desire to rewrite the losing narrative of Vietnam War to a narrative that
framed America’s triumphant return. Many within the U.S, government, especially
presidents and their administrations, felt that the Vietnam Syndrome was an unacceptable
restraint on their ability to conduct foreign policy in matters of national security interests
such as containment. That is why Hollywood dispatched actors such as Chuck Norris and
Sylvester Stallone to rematch an enemy that after a decade, had become entrenched
within American film as just as fanatical as America’s World War II enemies.93 Released
in tandem with one and other, the two biggest revisionist narrative movies, the Rambo
trilogy starring Sylvester Stallone, and the Missing in Action trilogy, starring Chuck
Norris, both meant to challenge the notion of a torn, wounded America. Best
encapsulating America’s emergence from the ashes of the war was Sylvester Stallone’s
personification of the fictional character, Rambo.
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Sylvester Stallone carried forward the revisionist narrative through the superherolike one-man army as John Rambo in Rambo: First Blood released on October 1, 1982.
Depicted throughout the film and what became a running theme throughout the trilogy,
Stallone embodied the ideal that many desired for the outcome of the Vietnam War – a
triumphant show of force that unequivocally defeats the enemy in a decisive victory for
justice. After being wrongfully convicted for murdering a police officer and resisting
arrest, Stallone’s character got the chance, to redeem himself in Rambo: First Blood II.
Released on May 22, 1985, Rambo was released from jail on special orders to gather
intelligence on POW camps in Vietnam. The addition of the POW/MIA narrative is
significant because many Americans believed with a devout and popular conviction that
more than 2,400 MIA soldiers remained in Vietnam and Laos.94 From Richard Crenna’s
character, Trautman, telling Rambo, “John, I want you to try and forget the war,
remember the mission, the old Vietnam is dead,” to the iconic electric torture scene,
where Rambo suffered excruciating torture at the hands of the Russians without turning
on his country which had deserted him, Rambo: First Blood II epitomized the revisionist
narrative.95 Rambo’s commitment to service and overcoming the stacked odds, while
redeeming himself for the original loss of the war, is the exact narrative that presidents
and their administrations wanted from the Vietnam War, establishing Rambo as a key
symbol for America’s recovery from the war. Adding to the revisionist narrative movies,
another big-name star entered the arena to rewrite the script of the Vietnam War.
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Chuck Norris, in the Missing in Action trilogy, adhered to the same Vietnam
narrative of rescuing POW’s like the Rambo trilogy. Missing in Action, released on
November 16, 1984, follows the story of Chuck Norris’ character, Colonel James
Braddock, a former Vietnam POW who had escaped, similar to Rambo, and his drive to
return to Vietnam in order to right the POW issue. Adding more action and firefights, the
opening scene depicting Braddock running through mortar fire, taking out enemy
Vietcong and saving fallen soldiers, to the scene where Braddock stands up to General
Tran, played by James Hong, in a formal diplomatic hearing, Missing in Action remains
true to the revisionist narrative.96 The symbolism of the U.S. standing strong in the face
of their enemy could be one take away message from Missing in Action conveyed
through Braddock’s character. Sylvester Stallone and Chuck Norris both brought fame
and notoriety to the revisionist narrative message, but there were numerous other
revisionist Vietnam War films that continued to challenge the lingering effects of the
Vietnam Syndrome.
Adhering to the familiar abandoned POW/MIA soldier narrative, William Katt
plays Lt. Steve Shepard in White Ghost, released on November 18, 1988. Lt. Steve
Shepard is a U.S. special forces operator who went MIA during the Vietnam War. He
was given the nickname, the White Ghost, throughout Indochina since he presumably
moved throughout the forests collecting the souls of American soldiers who would never
return home. While Shepard remained within the forests of Vietnam, he found a wife and
had a child on the way when a border war broke out forcing Shepard to contact his old
unit for an extraction. Of course, due to the Vietnam Syndrome, many did not want to
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openly admit to the rumors of the potential thousands of MIA/POW soldiers trapped in
Vietnam. To many, the wounds of Vietnam needed to be healed, not reopened by going
back in to save those left behind. This is evident by the way the movie handled Shepard’s
extraction from Vietnam. Once Shepard’s message “Two to be extracted” was received, a
panel of military and intelligent officers responded, “Two prisoners of war?” which was
met with the panel’s reply, “Survivors at this point in time are not going to make us look
good.”97 After some deliberation, Major Cross (Reb Brown) decided to send Shepard’s
former commanding officer Waco, and Waco’s mercenary team to extract Shepard,
unaware of the fact that Shepard and Waco had a falling out over Waco’s orders to kill an
entire village during the war. Once that fact eventually came to light, Major Cross
recognized the gravity of the situation and flew to Vietnam himself to quietly handle the
situation.
When Major Cross lands in Vietnam he is promptly met by a U.S. diplomat
concerned about his charter of a private helicopter ride. The U.S. diplomat says, “I can’t
let you jeopardize what is already a delicate political situation. Major, there are no
Americans alive in Vietnam. Have you got that?” Major Cross replies, “No, sir.” Where
the diplomat replies, “Damn it, it’s over now. It’s old news. Nobody believes that shit
anymore,” Major Cross responds with, “I still do.”98 This scene reveals that there was
pressure within Congress to forget the military and leave men behind in order to end the
suffering of the nation. However, despite those beliefs, there were still people like Major
Cross who believed in ‘no man left behind.’ In true heroic fashion, Shepard slowly takes
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out Waco’s mercenaries who had marked him for dead, battles his way through a
Vietcong POW camp to save his wife and unborn child, finally defeats Waco, and
bravely carries his wife to a helicopter from which Major Cross jumps out firing two
machine guns at the Vietcong, providing cover for Shepard and his wife. Once in the
helicopter, Shepard hands Major Cross the pile of dog tags from fallen America soldiers
he had collected and Major Cross welcomes him home. White Ghost epitomizes several
distinct characteristics of the revisionist narrative films: a narrative in which America got
the chance to quietly and successfully complete the objective to rescue all prisoners of
war, confront injustice, and emerge as the gun-toting savior who arrives in the final hour
to end the war the way it should have ended all along. Channeling that image to the core,
sitting U.S. president at the time, Ronald Regan, capitalized on this revisionist narrative
by openly supporting the symbolic representation of America’s redemption through the
revisionist narrative.
President Ronald Reagan and the U.S. Public: An Anti-Communist Hollywood
Winning the 1980 presidential election on the premise that he and his
administration would be tough on communism, President Reagan needed all the help he
could get to defeat the restrictive and lingering effects of the Vietnam Syndrome. One
way in which President Reagan and his administration influenced the U.S. public’s
collective cultural view of war away from the anti-interventionist position to a powerful,
freedom-fighting machine-like Rambo, was to endorse the very image that the
administration was trying to convey. In a speech given by President Reagan in May of
1988, he personally endorsed the Rambo trilogy by stating,
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In a few weeks, a new movie comes out called Rambo III. You remember
in the first Rambo, he took over a town, in the second he single-handedly defeated
several communist armies, and now in the third Rambo film, they say he really
gets tough. Almost makes me wish I could serve a third term.99

President Reagan’s personal endorsement of the Rambo trilogy is significant for a
couple of reasons. First, by endorsing the revisionist narrative, President Reagan
continued his eradication of the Vietnam Syndrome on the American public’s collective
view of war. Second, it provides an explanation into President Reagan foreign policy
decisions which will be discussed at length in chapter two. President Reagan not only
personally endorsed the Rambo trilogy, but he also received a signed Rambo II
promotional poster from Sylvester Stallone. At a State Republican Fundraising dinner in
Los Angeles, California in 1985, Stallone personally gave President Reagan the framed
promotional poster with the inscription, “To President Reagan, best of life, and all the
best for the future.”100 President Reagan released a statement saying, “I saw Rambo last
night, and next time I’ll know what to do.”101 Not only does this show that President
Reagan had actually seen the movies, but it shows that he approved of Rambo’s methods.
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This type of action was not uncommon for President Reagan as his time as
president of the Screen Actors Guild in the late 1940s. In his role as president of the
Screen Actors Guild in Hollywood, Ronald Reagan was at the forefront of keeping
communism out of mainstream Hollywood. In 1947, he was summoned to testify before
Congress on October 20th in connection with the Committee on Un-American Activities
about his understanding of the communist influence on the motion picture industry.102
Reagan’s integrity, prior to the subpoena, was called into question in connection to some
old leftist ties, until a memo was sent throughout the Committee on Un-American
Activities clearing his name of any communist connection or affiliations. The memo read,
“I happen to have been raised in the same town with Reagan, and know him very well
[...] he will go to Washington if we request him to do so.”103 In a transcript of his
testimony to Congress, Reagan was asked by Congressmen Stripling what steps, if any,
were needed to be taken to rid the motion-picture industry of any communist influence.
Reagan replied,
We have done a pretty good job in our business of keeping those people’s
activities curtailed. [...] we have exposed their lies when we came across them, we
have opposed their propaganda, and I can certainly testify that in the case of the
Screen Actors Guild we have been eminently successful in preventing them, with
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their usual tactics, trying to run a majority of an organization with a wellorganized minority.104

From his early days as president of the Screen Actors Guild to his tenure in office
as president of the United States, Ronald Reagan used his influence to combat
communism both at home and abroad.
President Reagan’s congressional testimony is significant in that it reveals how he
and others within the film industry were actively preventing and hindering communist
rhetoric and propaganda from entering the mainstream media, and it highlights how the
motion-picture industry can be influenced and manipulated by political agendas. This
thesis offers evidence for the similarities apparent in Hollywood and shown by President
Reagan capitalizing and profiting from the revisionist narrative. In President Reagan’s
case, the revisionist narrative attempted to rewrite the detrimental narrative of the
Vietnam War into a triumphant American epic which was an effective rhetorical device
to eradicate the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome.
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Chapter One Conclusion
Within this chapter, there are several distinct areas within which the Vietnam
Syndrome and its effects are studied. The first area of consideration is in the creation of
the Vietnam Syndrome itself and the effect on the U.S. public. The second area is the
Vietnam Syndrome and its representation within popular culture. The third area of
exploration is how the uniquely American syndrome altered the people’s cultural view of
war away from the policy of containment and towards a policy of isolation. Outlining key
events that contributed to the creation of the Vietnam Syndrome and how it impacted the
U.S. public and foreign and domestic policy decisions are important for two distinct
reasons. First, it establishes what the Vietnam Syndrome is, how it was created, and what
its long-term effects were. Second, it establishes the Vietnam Syndrome as something
that was created by the American populace and viewed as a limitation to those in
leadership, following the Vietnam Syndrome’s dual meanings.
By tracing the Vietnam Syndrome through media reports from a variety of
different times periods throughout the post-Vietnam era, a clear picture emerges on how
the Vietnam Syndrome continued to linger throughout the entirety of the post-Vietnam
era. Between 1975 and 1991 the U.S. public held the majority view that the U.S. should
refrain from intervening in developing world conflicts. The adoption of this isolationist
policy by the U.S public indicates a shift from the previous collective psycho-cultural
view of war away from the policy of containment which led the U.S. into both the Korean
and the Vietnam War, and ultimately, towards the isolationist policy propagated by the
Vietnam Syndrome. It is also important to establish this shift within the collect psychocultural view of war within the populace because it shows that this change created
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significant restraints on presidents and their administration's ability to conduct foreign
policy in accordance with containment policy, prompting them to label the Vietnam
Syndrome as something that needed to be eradicated. It should come as no surprise that
this combative narrative within the U.S. culture was mirrored within the U.S. popular
culture in the form of Hollywood movies. The combating narratives of the Vietnam
Syndrome during the post-Vietnam era was represented in the realist vs revisionist
narratives that Hollywood portrayed in its movies. More popular amongst the U.S. public,
the realist narrative represented in movies like Apocalypse Now and Platoon battled
against the revisionist narratives of Rambo and Missing In Action, the latter of which
were capitalized on by both Hollywood and those in power – more specifically by
President Reagan. By endorsing the revisionist Rambo narrative, President Reagan
appeared to have capitalized on the persuasive symbolism and rhetorical value that the
revisionist narrative embodied, as a means to try and rewrite the script of the Vietnam
War to combat the restraining effects of the Vietnam Syndrome on containment policy
and his staunch anti-communist rhetoric. Serving as the focal point of chapter two, this
thesis further examines how U.S. presidents during the post-Vietnam era used different
rhetorical messages to defeat the aforementioned effects of the Vietnam Syndrome.
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CHAPTER TWO: PRESIDENTS, THEIR RHETORIC, AND CHALLENGING THE
ANTI-INTERVENTIONIST EFFECTS OF THE VIETNAM SYNDROME ON U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS
From the creation of the Vietnam Syndrome to the widening credibility gap, the
anti-war movement and various other events outlined in chapter one changed the U.S.
public’s view of war. Altering the American populace’s collective cultural view of war
towards one of anti-intervention challenged the established Cold War foreign policy
agenda of containment, depriving presidents, their administrations, and Congress of a
consensus on foreign policy. That is why post-Vietnam-era presidents and their
administrations implemented different rhetorical messages to unshackle, in their view, the
incarcerating effects of the Vietnam Syndrome from foreign policy decisions. If
presidents and their administrations wanted to defeat the Soviets with containment policy,
they would have to carefully frame their rhetorical messages according to the public’s
opinion while simultaneously trying to challenge the anti-interventionist effects of the
Vietnam Syndrome.
The first of the post-Vietnam era presidents, Gerald R. Ford, held the unique
responsibility of presiding over the conclusion of the Vietnam War. President Ford’s dual
rhetorical message of addressing the wounds of the war while presenting the United
States as a strong united force committed to its global responsibilities was his
administration’s attempt to challenge the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam
Syndrome. President Ford’s dual message did not last long however, since by the time of
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President Jimmy Carter’s inauguration in January 1977, the U.S. had once again assumed
the role of mediator of peace and freedom. Focusing on brokering peace in the Middle
East between Egypt and Israel, President Carter sought to rebrand America’s
international image as the humanitarian peace brokers of the world. By the end of the
decade, however, the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan, threatening the security of
Persian Gulf oil, and the Iran-Iraq War rapidly escalated on both sides indicating that the
Cold War was heating up in the new theater of the Middle East.
Winning the 1980 election on the foundation of being tough on communism,
President Ronald Reagan’s covert intervention in the Soviet-Afghan War appeased the
growing concerns of communist influence within the Middle East. From his re-election in
1984 until he left office in 1989, President Reagan's maverick-like persona led him and
his administration to act outside of Congress to protect the security of the western
hemisphere from communist insurgencies within Central America. The Reagan
administration acted outside of Congress in an effort to not only support his tough stance
on communism, but also to challenge the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam
Syndrome. From President Ford to President Reagan, post-Vietnam-era presidents and
their administrations were able to challenge the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam
Syndrome by using different rhetorical messages supported by each presidential
administration’s foreign policy objectives. The first rhetorical strategy used to challenge
the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome was President Ford’s dual
rhetorical message.
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President Gerald Ford: The Tale of Two Narratives
President Ford, inaugurated on August 9, 1974, inherited a deeply divided and
skeptical nation experiencing the lasting effects of the Vietnam Syndrome. President Ford
was primarily concerned with addressing the domestic issues created by the fallout of the
war but wanted to do so from a position of strength. In other words, his rhetoric needed to
acknowledge the wounds of the nation and simultaneously display the strength of the
state of the union. President Ford had to frame his rhetoric on both domestic and foreign
policy issues within a dual narrative that was aided by his deliberate continued détente
with the Soviet Union. As a means of furthering détente with the Soviet Union, President
Ford signed both the Vladivostok Accords in November 1974 and the Helsinki Accords
in August of 1975.105 The successor treaty to SALT I, the Vladivostok Accords,
represented the continued debate on arms control provisions between the Soviet Union
and the United States, while the Helsinki Accords involved Soviet and European leaders
joining together with the United States to agree upon existing European boundaries and
support for human rights; both accords were attempts on President Ford’s part to ease
tension with the Soviet Union.106 President Ford’s success with achieving manageable
tension levels with the Soviet Union early in his presidency allowed him the time to focus
on his attempts to heal the country’s war.
Speaking from the cabinet room in the White House, one of Ford’s first acts as
president, aside from pardoning his predecessor, was to address the long-time issue of
Vietnam era draft dodgers and deserters. Pardoning President Nixon and draft dodgers
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were attempts by the Ford administration to heal the wounds of the nation. On September
16, 1974, President Ford announced a program for the return of Vietnam era draft
dodgers and military deserters.107 President Ford stated that "On August 19, I announced
my intention to give these young people a chance to earn their return to the mainstream of
American society so they can contribute to the building and the betterment of our country
and the world […] I was determined then, as now, to do everything in my power to bind
up the Nation’s wounds.”108 President Ford recognized that those who had evaded the
draft and or deserted the military while enlisted were viewed as traitors by many
Americans, which ran the risk of further dividing an already deeply divided country. The
Ford administration rhetorically positioned itself behind the unification of America by
accepting those who evaded enlistment and choosing not to persecute and exclude them.
Continuing with his rhetoric of healing the country’s wounds, on April 10, 1975,
President Ford stood before Congress, the U.S. public, and the world to report America’s
course of action internationally after the conclusion of the Vietnam War. Covering topics
that ranged from requesting more military, economic, and humanitarian aid to South
Vietnam to outlining key steps towards maintaining a détente with the Soviet Union.
President Ford took this opportunity to restate his agenda to heal the wounds of America.
Quoting a letter sent to him by acting Cambodian President Saukham Khoy, President
Ford relayed, "I cannot believe that this confidence was misplaced and that suddenly
America will deny us the means which might give us a chance to find an acceptable
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solution to our conflict.”109 President Ford stresses his dual rhetorical message in his
reply to President Khoy when he stated:
We cannot, in the meantime, abandon our friends while our adversaries strengthen
and encourage theirs. We cannot dismantle our defenses, our diplomacy, or our
intelligence capabilities while others increase and strengthen theirs. Let us put an
end to self-inflicted wounds. Let us remember that our national unity is a most
priceless asset. Let us deny our adversaries the satisfaction of using Vietnam to pit
Americans against Americans. At this moment, the U.S. must present to the world
a united front.110
By pushing for the integration of draft dodgers and deserters back into society
while also promoting détente with the Soviet Union, President Ford appeased the antiinterventionist zeal of the U.S. public and Congress which was being fueled by the lasting
effects of the Vietnam Syndrome. His rhetoric also derived from a place of strength with
the call for America to stand with its allies and command a united front.
Shortly after his speech to Congress, President Ford addressed Tulane University
at their convocation with the same message of healing the country’s wounds. In his
speech to the students and faculty, President Ford drew parallels to a historical instance
of restoring America’s image. He cited America’s devastating loss during the War of
1812 and highlighted how only two years following the conclusion of the war, the
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monumental victory of the Battle of New Orleans restored national pride.111 President
Ford recalled “outnumbered Americans innovated, outnumbered Americans used the
tactics of the frontier to defeat a veteran British force.”112 President Ford bolstered his
rhetorical message further by stating:
As I see it, the time has come to look forward to an agenda for the future, to unify,
to bind up the Nations wounds, and to restore its health and its optimistic selfconfidence. In New Orleans, a great battle was fought after a war was over, in
New Orleans tonight, we can begin a national reconciliation.113
President Ford's rhetorical message of healing coupled with his insistence that the United
States uphold its international responsibilities by standing with its allies were aimed at
trying to reconcile the limiting effects of the Vietnam Syndrome and to unify the vastly
divided country he inherited.
In his annual State of the Union Address on January 19, 1976, President Ford
focused on the national mood. He acknowledged the troubled state of the country by
citing an economy ravaged by inflation and plunged into a worsening recession; however,
in a move to motivate the American public, President Ford bluntly spoke to the national
mood with his declaration, “I say it is time we quit downgrading ourselves as a nation
[…] Of course, it is our responsibility to learn the right lessons from past mistakes […]
but the world's troubles will not go away."114 President Ford attempted to shift the
American public’s focus from sulking over the Vietnam War since it was negatively
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impeding the U.S. from supporting its allies which imparted weakness to the world, an
image President Ford would not tolerate. He addressed this issue when he stated, “We
must not face a future in which we can no longer help our friends, such as Angola, even
in limited and carefully controlled ways.115 We must not lose all capacity to respond short
of military intervention.”116 Once again, in one speech he relayed his dual rhetorical
message of healing from strength, revealing his continued attempts to lessen the limiting
effects of the Vietnam Syndrome preventing his ability to support U.S. allies against
encroaching enemies.
In his third and final State of the Union, President Ford recapped and framed his
presidency within the context of a deeply divided and crippled nation. President Ford
states,
When I became President on August 9, 1974, our Nation was deeply divided and
tormented. In rapid succession, the Vice President and the President had resigned
in disgrace. We were still struggling with the after-effects of a long, unpopular,
and bloody war in Southeast Asia. The economy was unstable and racing toward
the worst recession in 40 years. People were losing jobs. The cost of living was
soaring. The Congress and the Chief executive were at loggerheads. The integrity
of our constitutional process and other institutions were being questioned.117
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After President Ford framed his presidency within the poor conditions in which he
inherited it, he addressed how his administration was more successful than his
predecessor in moving the country back towards unity and prosperity; however, President
Ford also highlighted how the Vietnam War significantly impacted the nation by altering
its cultural view of war. President Ford stated that "The Vietnam War, both materially
and psychologically, affected our overall defense posture. The dangerous antimilitary
sentiment discouraged defense spending and unfairly disparaged the men and women
who served in the Armed Forces.”118 President Ford warned the U.S. public of the
consequences for allowing the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome to
impact America’s international responsibilities to its allies. He cautioned, "The U.S. can
never tolerate a shift in the strategic balance against us [and] the U.S. would risk the most
serious political consequences if the world came to believe that our adversaries have a
decisive margin of superiority.”119 President Ford’s rhetoric heavily relied on the dual
narrative of healing the wounds of a country in a post-Vietnam era while simultaneously
staging a position of strength to the world because he and his administration feared losing
the balance of world power and the subsequent potential demise of the American political
system.
President Ford: Rhetoric In Action
Following the similar dual narrative of his rhetoric, President Ford’s foreign
policy delicately balanced a dual message of supporting allies abroad and calling for
more allied support in return. For example, President Ford authorized National Security
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Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 270 on September 24, 1974 and NSDM-315 on January
31, 1976, both regarding military assistance to Israel. NSDM-270 lists all the approved
military items, along with certain additional item’s to be sold to Israel.120 While NSDM315 revised Israel’s military budget to no more than a total exceeding $2.0 billion worth
of U.S. military equipment.121 It is clear that President Ford was motivated to support his
rhetoric of U.S. continued commitment to its allies abroad within his foreign policy.
However, signs of the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome are evident in
President Ford’s foreign policy.
On May 3, 1975, President Ford authorized NSDM-293 which requested more
Allied contributions to the collective security of NATO. NSDM-293 states that, “In
general, given the recent change in the world monetary system and in economic
conditions, greater emphasis should be given to encourage our NATO Allies to increase
the quality and effectiveness of their own forces.”122 Furthermore, NSDM-293 states that,
“Representatives of the U.S. Government should emphasize to our NATO Allies that
their efforts to strengthen their own forces…will be viewed by the U.S. Government as
their most significant contribution to the sharing of the burden of NATO defense.”123
President Ford’s request for Allied members to increase their contribution to the
collective security of western powers is a clear indication that the U.S. needed time to
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recover from the Vietnam War and that the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam
Syndrome had permeated into U.S. foreign policy. NSDM-293 is also an indication of
President Ford and his administration’s attempt to support their rhetoric of supporting
U.S. Allies.
President Ford continued his dual message with his authorization of NSDM-322
on March 31, 1976. NSDM-322 set out to address captured American equipment in
Indochina, specifically in Vietnam. NSDM-322 adhered to President Ford’s dual
narrative for on one hand, NSDM-322 is meant to discourage Vietnam from selling
captured American equipment by taking a public stance of the sale; but on the other, will
do what can be done discreetly to help countries that support U.S. policies if they decide
to purchase from Vietnam.124 Moreover, NSDM-322 instructed that the U.S. “take all
feasible measures to impede sales to others.”125 President Ford once again supported his
dual narrative rhetoric by trying to remain committed to America’s allies by discreetly
selling them captured American equipment, while also trying to project strength by
publicly standing against the illegal sale of captured U.S. equipment. By trying to enforce
his rhetoric with foreign policy, President Ford had to delicately balance the show of
strength and commitment to the Allies, with the healing of America’s wounds and
encouraging other allied NATO nations to increase their contributions to NATO.
Even though President Ford’s primary message was to unify and heal the wounds
caused by the Vietnam War, throughout his presidency he would often espouse the
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rhetoric projecting U.S. strength through constant support for its allies against mutual
enemies. In the case of Angola, however, the Ford administration failed in their objective
and it was instances such as Angola and the constant push for détente with the Soviet
Union that caused conservatives from both political parties, members of Ford’s cabinet
like Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and California governor at the time, Ronald
Reagan, to believe that Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger underestimated the severity of the
Soviet threat and were too unwilling to confront the Soviets from a believable position of
strength.126 Despite conservatives calling for more forceful action against the Soviet
Union, the American people and Congress still warranted messages of unification and
healing if they were to be persuaded back towards favoring an interventionist stance.
President Jimmy Carter: The Humanitarian Peace Broker
Following in the footsteps of his predecessor, President Carter advocated for the
further de-escalation of tensions between America and the Soviet Union through a policy
of continued détente. President Carter’s rhetoric deviated from President Ford's message,
however, in that it focused on revitalizing America’s humanitarian values and restoring
America's image away from the policeman of the world and towards the peace brokers of
the world. By re-establishing the U.S. image, President Carter hoped the American
people would once again trust in their government’s ability to conduct foreign policy in
accordance with the moral and ethical standards established under Wilsonianism and the
U.N. declaration of human rights.
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President Carter’s use of Wilsonian rhetoric was not a hollow ploy to gain the
support of the American people to start another major war or funding from Congress to
increase the war budget. Within his own foreign policy objective and moral compass,
President Carter believed in the universal rule of law among international affairs and the
right of all people to self-determination.127 Furthermore, President Carter made it clear
that America would exercise extreme caution when considering using force and would do
all in its power to avoid military intervention. The implementation of détente strategies
with the Soviet Union allowed President Carter to further his peace broker message and
focus on spreading his Wilsonian rhetoric. A way in which President Carter sought to reestablish America’s Wilsonian image was by prioritizing human rights throughout his
administration’s rhetoric. During his 1976 campaign, then Governor of Georgia Carter
promised that his administration would secure human rights as fundamental to his foreign
policy which proved popular with voters.128 Beginning with his inaugural address,
President Carter sought to establish his administration and his presidential legacy as the
humanitarian peace broker of the world.
In his January 20, 1977 Inaugural Address, President Carter opened by paying
homage to President Ford and his administration's hard-fought presidency. President
Carter stated, "I want to thank my predecessor for all he has done to heal our land."129
Briefly connecting his own message to President Ford’s message of unification and
healing the country's wounds, President Carter additionally called for the American
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people to unite under the values of Wilsonianism as a means to illuminate the way to
peace and safety. President Carter declared,
Let our recent mistakes bring a resurgent commitment to the basic
principles of our Nation, for we know that if we despise our own government, we
have no future. We recall in special times when we have stood briefly, but
magnificently, united.130

President Carter called for the U.S. public to stand united and protect human
rights as he stated “Our commitment to human rights must be absolute, our laws fair […]
the powerful must not persecute the weak, and human dignity must be enhanced.”131
Moreover, President Carter called for the public to unite under Wilsonianism to spread
democracy, freedom, and Wilsonian values. President Carter stated, "Our Nation can be
strong abroad only if it is strong at home [and] the best way to enhance freedom in other
lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation."132 He
called for a new passion for freedom, and by "Tapping this new spirit, there can be no
nobler more ambitious task for America to undertake on this day of a new beginning than
to help shape a just and peaceful world that is truly humane."133 His inauguration speech
implies that President Carter was determined to not only right the wrongs of the world,
but to rebrand the U.S. as the peace brokers of the world rather than its policeman. It
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comes as no surprise that early in his presidency, President Carter took on one of the
world’s most war-torn regions, the Middle East.
On September 18, 1978, President Carter announced the historic peace agreement
between Egypt and Israel known as the Camp David Accords. With 2,000 years of
conflict, war, and animosity, the will and determination of both Egypt and Israel to reach
peace along with the negotiations and mediation of the U.S., broke through centuries of
hate and violence and allowed for the two leaders to finally approach one another as
equals. President Carter stated,
At Camp David, we sought a peace that is not only of vital importance to
their own two nations but to all people of the Middle East, to all the people of the
United States, and, indeed, to all the world as well…The United States has had no
choice not to be deeply concerned about the Middle East and to try to use our
influence and our efforts to advance the cause of peace…We have a long-standing
friendship among the nations there and the peoples of the region, and we have
profound moral commitments which are deeply rooted in our values as
people…The strategic location of these countries and the resources that they
possess mean that events in the Middle East directly affect people everywhere.
We and our friends could not be indifferent if a hostile power were to establish
domination there. In few areas of the world is there a greater risk that a local
conflict could spread among other nations adjacent to them and then, perhaps,
erupt into a tragic confrontation between us superpowers, ourselves. 134
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President Carter spoke not only to the triumph of peace and diplomacy between
nations but to the shift in global politics and the necessity to keep the Middle East free for
the world. President Carter concluded his Camp David speech with a message from one
man of faith to another. He relayed, “We have a chance for peace because these two
leaders found within themselves the willingness to work together to seek these lasting
prospects for peace,”135 and continued on to say, “I would like to say, as a Christian, to
these two friends of mine, the words of Jesus, ‘Blessed are the peacemakers, for they
shall be the children of God.’”136 Successfully brokering peace within the Middle East
gave President Carter the win that his administration required to secure the trust of the
American people in their government’s ability to successfully conduct foreign policy
within the moral and ethical guide lines of Wilsonianism.
On January 23, 1979, President Carter addressed the U.S. in his annual State of
the Union. Among the usual topics like economics, domestic and foreign policy, and
energy, President Carter also used his State of the Union Address to strengthen America’s
newly established Wilsonian image by mentioning its responsibility to its NATO allies
abroad and distinguishing the U.S. as the peacemaker of the world. President Carter
stated,
But our national security in this complicated age requires more than just
military might. In less than a lifetime, world population has more than doubled,
colonial empires have disappeared, and a hundred new nations have been born
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and migration to the world's cities have all awakened new yearnings for economic
justice and human rights among people everywhere.137

President Carter’s Wilsonian rhetoric of self-determination and human rights for
newly freed post-colonial countries still fighting for their rights, combined forces with his
plan to beat the Soviet Union by showcasing an economically strong and united America
and pitching democracy as a system worth emulating. President Carter also continued to
differentiate the U.S. from its previous image as policeman of the world to the
peacemaker of the world. President Carter confirmed, “We have no desire to be the
world’s policeman. But America does want to be the world’s peacemaker.”138 By
rebranding the U.S. image away from the policeman and towards that of the peacemaker,
President Carter was able to satisfy the U.S. public's call for peace. As conflict began to
erupt in the Middle East, however, and the slow Soviet military buildup began mobilizing
in Afghanistan, the American public rapidly turned its attention towards concern of
potential warfare.
In the span of less than one year, from December 1979 to September 1980, two
major conflicts erupted in the Middle East and Southwest Asia that demanded the U.S.
public’s attention. First, on December 24, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded the sovereign
country of Afghanistan to establish a satellite Socialist government that was intended for
protection under the Soviet umbrella. Second, on September 22, 1980, Iran and Iraq
opened fire at border towns with long-range artillery fire kickstarting the Iran-Iraq War.
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President Carter began to receive pressure from his constituents to show more resolve in
the face of these international affairs but was not able to demonstrate enough aggression
or successfully bring an end to the Iranian hostage crisis – a feat that his successor was
able to achieve a year later in January 1981. On January 23, 1980, only a month after the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and roughly eight months before the start of Iran-Iraq
War, President Carter announced the establishment of a new Middle East policy in his
State of the Union Address in order to introduce his new rhetorical position.
To appear tougher on communism, President Carter claimed the Middle East
under the security and protection of the America, and in his 1980 State of the Union
made absolutely clear that,
Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of
America and as such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force.139
Backing up his statement with action, President Carter proposed a five-year
defense program that would increase the annual real commitment for defense roughly
five percent without any reductions.140 He wanted to present a stronger front against
communism because unlike his campaign years, peace had already been brokered, and
the American people wanted someone willing and able to protect American interests
abroad. President Carter’s attempt to radically switch his rhetoric from promoting peace
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and human rights to returning as the policeman of the world seemed unlikely and his
opponents took notice. One conservative Republican in particular, Jeane Kirkpatrick,
who became the U.S representative to the U.N. under the Reagan administration artfully
attacked President Carter for apparently undercutting American allies by criticizing their
poor human rights record. Attacks like Kirkpatrick’s proved damaging to President
Carter’s image in the 1980 presidential election and he eventually lost re-election to the
Hollywood actor turned governor of California, Ronald Reagan, in part due to Reagan’s
tough rhetorical position on communism, which was the message that resonated with the
majority of the American public.141
President Carter: Rhetoric In Action
In his years as president, following his rhetoric of the U.S. as the peace broker not
the policeman of the world, President Carter supported his message of humanitarianism
through supplemental foreign policy decisions. The first of these decisions came about on
August 24, 1977 with President Carter’s authorization of Presidential Directive/NSC-18
covering America’s national strategy. Provided under the presumption that U.S.-Soviet
relations, for the foreseeable future, would be one of continued competition and
cooperation, President Carter made it part of his administration’s strategy to “compete
politically with the Soviet Union by pursuing the basic American commitment to human
rights and national independence.”142 More than just an attempt to persuade the U.S.
public and the international community to view the U.S. as a peace broker, President
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Carter used his humanitarian rhetoric to support foreign policy strategies centered around
human rights to counter Soviet actions.
Authorized on February 17, 1978, NSC-30 spoke directly to President Carter’s
insistence that a fundamental objective of U.S. foreign policy under his administration
would be prioritizing universal human rights. NSC-30 states that, “It shall be a major
objective of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout
the world.”143 Furthermore, President Carter detailed seven points explaining exactly how
the U.S. planned to secure international human rights. Among the seven points, point six
reads,
The U.S. shall not, other than in exceptional circumstances, take any action which
would result in material of financial support to the police, civil law enforcement
authorities, or other performing internal security functions of governments
engaged in serious violations of human rights.144
Point six is important to note because after President Carter lost the 1980
presidential election to the more aggressive anti-communist message given by Ronald
Reagan, Reagan’s foreign policy completely abandoned the previous administration’s
humanitarian slant. President Reagan directly opposed President Carter’s established
humanitarian policy by supplying arms to the Mujahedeen during the Soviet Afghan War,
actively lying to Congress about human rights violations in El Salvador, and illegally
trading arms for hostages to Iran, all while spouting his administration’s rhetoric of being
tough on communism.
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President Ronald Reagan: Revitalization Of Interventionist Rhetoric
After repeated rhetorical messages of healing, peace, and humanitarianism,
coupled with the rising conflicts in Southwest Asia and the Middle East, the American
public wanted a president who could be rhetorically tough on communism. The public
felt that President Carter’s approach was too soft, and at least initially, Americans voiced
higher satisfaction with President Reagan’s harder line towards the Soviets.145
Inaugurated into office on January 20, 1981, President Reagan sought to uphold his
campaign promises and crack down on communism by taking direct action against the
lasting effects of the Vietnam Syndrome on U.S. foreign policy. President Reagan wanted
to be tough on communism by using force while the U.S. public and Congress were not
quite yet ready for military action – instead, both preferred a stricter yet diplomatic
solution of containment through continued détente with the Soviet Union. Yet, the Soviet
Union showed little indication of limiting its expansion, prompting some within Congress
and the Reagan administration to feel that actions rather than words were necessary to
protect America’s vital national security interests abroad from communist influence. That
is why in an attempt to satisfy the anti-interventionist needs of the America populace and
Congress, as well as the interventionist needs of his administration, President Reagan
used a specific rhetorical message that directly targeted the Vietnam Syndrome, promoted
the concepts of peace through strength, labeled the Soviet Union as the evil empire, all to
contextualize his foreign policy objectives in a way that best resonated with the U.S.
public and Congress. In doing so, he opposed both Congress and the newly re-established

Tom W. Smith, “American Attitudes Towards the Soviet Union and Communism,” Public Opinion
Quarterly 47, no. 2 (1983): 277.
145

77

humanitarian image to fund and support covert operations against communist
insurgencies in areas such as Central America, Southeast Asia and the Middle East which
were all vital to U.S. national security interests.
In an address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention in Chicago, on August
18, 1980, former Governor Reagan spoke of the lasting and limiting effects of the
Vietnam Syndrome on U.S. foreign policy as well as the U.S. public. Reagan stated that
"For too long, we have lived with the ‘Vietnam Syndrome.’ Over and over they [the
North Vietnamese] told us for nearly 10 years that we were the aggressors bent on
imperialistic conquest.”146 Reagan went on to say, “There is a lesson for all of us in
Vietnam, if we are forced to fight we must have the means and the determination to
prevail, or we will not have what it takes to secure peace.”147 President Reagan’s direct
rhetorical attack against the Vietnam Syndrome was a message to the U.S. public and
Congress to try and unshackle the limiting and anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam
Syndrome. According to Reagan, the Vietnam Syndrome prevented the U.S. from
securing peace in Vietnam, and that to gain peace, America had to rid society of the
Vietnam Syndrome. Another way President Reagan’s rhetorical message fought against
the limiting effects of the Vietnam Syndrome was through his message of peace through
strength, which harkened back to the rhetoric of President Carter’s early presidency.
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Nearly a month after his address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, on September
19, 1980, Reagan launched a televised address for his strategy for peace. In his address,
Reagan clearly outlined his definition of peace through strength:
We have heard the phrase peace through strength so often, its meaning has
become blurred through overuse. The time has come for America to recall one
more the basic truths behind the familiar words. Peace is made by the fact of
strong economic, military and strategic. Peace is lost when such strength
disappears or just as bad is seen by an adversary as disappearing. We must build
peace upon strength. There is no other way. And the cold, hard fact of the matter
is that our economic, military and strategic strength under President Carter is
eroding. Only if we are strong will peace be strong.148
By strongly emphasizing peace through economic, military, and strategic strength,
Reagan wanted the U.S. public and Congress to greenlight a new defense budget that
would meet the growing demands of the escalating conflicts between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union. Supporting his rhetoric, President Reagan, only two months after taking
office, followed the advice of his Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and presented
a five-year defense plan to Congress demanding a budget amounting to 1.5 trillion in
total.149 The largest peacetime defense budget increase in U.S. history meant that the
Reagan administration was committed to confronting the growing threat of Soviet
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aggression. As President Reagan and his administration’s rhetorical message continued,
they began to contextualize their message of confronting communism within the age-old
narrative of good vs. evil.
On March 8, 1983, in his remarks at an Annual Convention of the National
Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, FL, more popularly known as the “Evil Empire
Speech,” President Reagan sought to set the stage of his new attack on the Soviet Union
and the Vietnam Syndrome. President Reagan tapped into the moral and ethical ethos of
the U.S. public after a Washington based research council determined that Americans are
more religious than any other people in any other country, quoting that a staggering 95
percent of those who participated in the survey believed in God and a majority of those
felt the that the Ten Commandments had a meaningful impact in their lives.150 President
Reagan framed democracy within the guidelines of the Ten Commandments and the
moral teachings of Jesus Christ, placing America within a holy and righteous fight pitted
against the immoral and evil Soviet Union's communist government. He stated “they
repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas […] morality is entirely
subordinate to the interests of class war and everything is moral that is necessary for the
annihilation of the old. Exploiting social order and uniting the proletariat.”151 He
continued on with, “but until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the
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supremacy of the state, declare omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual
domination of all people on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.”152
By establishing the narrative of the U.S. on the side of Christ pitted against the atheist
communists, President Reagan attempted to justify to the U.S. public and Congress why
the Soviet Union posed such a grave threat to the peace and security of the American way
of life. Even though the good vs. evil narrative between the U.S. and the Soviet Union
had already been well established since the late 1940s, President Reagan placed the
rhetoric at the forefront of his messaging to not only emphasize the continued threat that
Soviet communism represented but to reiterate America’s moral high ground. By the
beginning of 1985, President Reagan sought to ramp up his rhetoric against the Soviet
Union, requesting that the American people and Congress support America’s democratic
allies against Soviet expansion.
In his 1985 State of the Union Address to Congress, President Reagan called for
the American people and Congress to break away from the decades of détente as a means
of containment and towards a more active interventionist stance that was more in line
with Paul Nitze’s interpretation of containment. Reagan stated, “We must stand by all our
democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives – on
every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua – to defy Soviet-supported aggression
and secure rights which have been ours from birth.”153 By 1985, President Reagan’s
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implementation of containment followed John Foster Dulles ‘rollback’ strategy in which
the United States actively pushed back at the Soviet’s expanding influence.154 This was
an attempt by the Reagan administration to please the more interventionist minded within
his administration and Congress. Further placating the interventionist mindset of the
Reagan administration, as well as making good on the campaign promise of defeating
communism, President Reagan and his administration provided arms to the Mujahideen
in the Soviet-Afghan War, lied to Congress about human right violations in El Salvador,
and completely sidestepped Congressional law by illegally funding the Contras in Central
America, all in order to help combat the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam
Syndrome.
President Reagan: Rhetoric In Action
The Soviet-Afghan War
Early in his presidency, President Reagan directed the U.S. public’s attention to
the freedom fighters in the mountains of Afghanistan, more popularly known as the
Mujahideen, since unchecked Soviet activity threatened stability within the Middle East.
To highlight the Mujahedeen’s cause, President Reagan dedicated the March 22nd launch
of the spaceship Columbia to those in Afghanistan fighting against Soviet occupation.
President Reagan relayed,
Just as the Columbia, we think, represents man’s finest aspirations in the
fields of science and technology, so too does the struggle of the Afghan people
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represent man’s highest aspirations for freedom. I am dedicating on behalf of the
American people, the March 22nd launch of the Columbia to the people of
Afghanistan.155

This was not the last time President Reagan called the plight of the Mujahideen in
Afghanistan to the attention of the U.S. public and Congress. Reagan also used his 1985
State of the Union Address to highlight the need for aid for both the Afghans as well as
the Nicaraguans. President Reagan’s strategy for aiding the Mujahideen in the SovietAfghan War was not to have them win, but rather, to make Afghanistan the Soviet’s own
Vietnam by arming rebels and bleed the Soviets into retreat.156 Supporting this, on
January 17, 1983, nearly two years before his 1985 State of the Union Address, President
Reagan signed NSDD-75 which adhered to his push to pull the Soviets into their own
Vietnam. NSDD-75 states that "Afghanistan: The U.S. objective is to keep maximum
pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets’ political, military, and
other costs remain high while the occupation continues.”157 The theory here was, if the
Soviet Union could get bogged down in a Vietnam quagmire as the U.S. did, the Soviet
Union would have no choice but to abandon its expansionist goals and retreat.
Moreover, President Reagan also chose to aid the Mujahideen because of the
continued anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome. President Reagan sought
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to support freedom fighters such as the Mujahideen as a means to uphold U.S.
intervention through containment by force. In March of 1985, President Reagan released
NSD-166, which aimed to specifically use covert operations as a means to confront the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and prevent the spread of communism. President Reagan
stated that “Our covert programs will deny Afghanistan as a secure base from which to
project power and influence in the region.”158 Shortly after the release of NSD-166,
President Reagan began ramping up support and aid to the Mujahideen. A New York
Times article published in April of 1988 stated that "The budget for the covert operation
more than doubled to 280 million in the fiscal year 1985 from 122 million in 1984."159
Struggling, however, to deter the more sophisticated and advanced military of the Soviet
Union, the Mujahedeen required more support to stop communist expansion.
Turning the tides in the war, the U.S. began shipping its top portable surface-toair Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen, who then used them against the Soviet's
dominating air power. By the summer of 1986 the Mujahedeen had acquired shipments of
the Stinger missile, and by September of the same year, the Mujahideen had successfully
shot down their first Soviet helicopter.160 At first, the use of the Stinger missiles was
under the supervision of U.S. Special Forces instructors and the Pakistan ISI, however,
with a kill rate of 75 percent, the Stinger missile became heavily sought after and was
handed out with limited regulation.161 America’s sale of Stinger missiles to the
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Mujahedeen proved to be the pivotal turning point of the Soviet-Afghan War in favor of
the Afghans. By the time the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan in 1989, the CIA
was exhibiting frantic attempts to buy back excess Stinger missiles to prevent them from
being sold on the black market. Unfortunately, the Stinger missile had been seen in use
during the Iran-Iraq War, and in October of 1987, the Pentagon had to acknowledge that
Iran had received spare parts for the Stinger missiles through the black market.162 The
issue of the Stinger missile being covertly used and sold on the black market did not stop,
however, prompting the H.W. Bush administration, years later, to enact Operation MIAS,
a frantic plea to Congress to authorize $10 million to buy back Stinger missiles from the
Gulf.163 The decision to sell advanced weapons to jihadist rebel groups like the
Mujahideen, who then sold these weapons to known U.S. enemies such as Iran,
reinforced the concept that those covert means directly opposed the previously
established humanitarian foreign policy of the Carter administration.
President Reagan further supported his rhetoric of being tough on communism by
authorizing another foreign policy initiative assessing U.S. strategy and objectives in
Afghanistan. NSDD-270, authorized on May 1, 1987, echoed the same objectives
established under NSDD-75. As a top U.S. objective in Afghanistan, NSDD-270 stated,
Raise the military and political costs to the Soviets of their occupation of
Afghanistan as a means of pressuring them into a comprehensive political
settlement that results in the prompt, complete, and irrevocable withdrawal of
Soviet troops and genuine Afghan self-determination.164
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President Reagan decided to continue the seven-year policy of draining Soviet military
and political resources into Afghanistan, similar to America’s actions in Vietnam, by
pressuring the Soviets to exit Afghanistan, all the while accruing similar sentiments the
U.S. felt through the Vietnam Syndrome. Furthermore, by authorizing directives such as
NSDD-75 and 270, the Reagan administration was simultaneously challenging the antiinterventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome by covertly intervening in Afghanistan
by arming the jihadist terrorist group the Mujahedeen. Unlike the Carter administration,
arms transfer’s such as Stinger missiles sales to the Mujahedeen, and the trading of arms
for hostages during the Iran-Contra scandal, were seen as an essential component to the
Reagan administration’s foreign policy.
President Reagan established early in his presidency, the fundamental imperative
that conventional arms transfers would be a continued practice in his administration’s
foreign policy. Authorized on July 8, 1991, NSDD-5 outlined exactly what his
administration’s goals and objectives would be concerning arms transfers. NSDD-5
states,
The United States cannot defend the free world’s interests alone. The United
States must, in today’s world, not only strengthen our own military capabilities,
but be prepared to help its friends and allies to strengthen theirs through the
transfer of conventional and other forms of security assistance. Such transfers
complement American security commitments and serve important United States
objectives. Prudently pursed, arms transfers can strengthen us.165
President Reagan authorized and emphasized policies such as NSDD-5 because of the
anti- effects of the Vietnam Syndrome. By using covert operations and arms transfers
such as in the Soviet-Afghan War, President Reagan not only was able intervene against
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the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but was able to do it without a national incident. That
is why even though supplying arms to jihadist terrorist groups such as the Mujahedeen
went against the newly re-established humanitarian image of the U.S., President Reagan
was willing to risk this image in order to challenge the anti-interventionist effects of the
Vietnam Syndrome. The Reagan administration further defied the re-established
humanitarian image of the U.S. by lying to Congress about human rights violations
occurring in El Salvador.
The El-Salvadoran Civil War
On March 24, 1980, Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated by a single
gunshot wound to the chest from Salvadorian Army officer Roberto D’Aubuisson. This
ignited a powder keg of violence and revolution throughout the country of El Salvador.
Several months later, in September of 1980, five major leftist revolutionary organizations
came together to form the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The
FMLN created a guerilla army to oppose the government and right-wing paramilitary
forces.166 By January 1981, the FMLN launched an all-out attack on the El Salvadorian
government, prompting the U.S. to intervene by providing the El Salvadorian government
with substantial military aid where, “Much of this aid went to the formation of the Rapid
Deployment Infantry Battalions, the same groups identified by the UN Truth Commission
as ‘the primary agents of war crimes.’”167 President Reagan’s zeal, especially in the form
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of military aid, to help prevent what was seen as a potential domino effect in Central and
South America led many within the U.S. public and Congress to question his motives.
On February 24, 1981, in a White House briefing on the Program for Economic
Recovery, President Reagan was asked, "Mr. President, is there any danger that we can
become involved in El Salvador to the point that we might not be able to extract
ourselves easily?" President Reagan replied, "No, I don't think so. I know that this is a
great concern. I think it's a part of the Vietnam Syndrome, but we have no intentions of
that kind of involvement.168 As he continued to maintain his tough rhetoric on
communism, he remained wary of the lingering anti-interventionist effects of the
Vietnam Syndrome. In fact, in September 1984, President Reagan surprisingly rejected
the request of U.S. military commander for Latin American, General Paul Gorman, for
American pilots to fly the larger AC-130 Specters against guerrilla strongholds because
he perceived it to be too risky politically.169 President Reagan, however, still felt that he
needed to intervene in the El Salvadorian Civil War to prevent the leftist revolution from
succeeding and preventing the Central American dominos from falling.
On April 27, 1983, President Reagan addressed Congress on the matter of Central
America needing an ally with the following rhetorical message:
The problem is that an aggressive minority has thrown its lot in with the
Communists, looking to the Soviets and their own Cuban henchmen to help them
pursue political change through violence. They preach the doctrine of a
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‘revolution without frontiers.’ Their first target is El Salvador. Important? Well, to
begin with, there's the sheer human tragedy. Thousands of people have already
died and, unless the conflict is ended democratically, millions more could be
affected throughout the hemisphere. The people of El Salvador have proved they
want democracy. But if guerrilla violence succeeds, they won't get it. El Salvador
will join Cuba and Nicaragua as a base for spreading fresh violence to Guatemala,
Honduras, Costa Rica – probably the most democratic country in the world today.
The killing will increase and so will the threat to Panama, the canal and,
ultimately, Mexico. In the process, vast numbers of men, women, and children
will lose their homes, their countries, and their lives. Make no mistake. We want
the same thing the people of Central America want – an end to the killing. We
want to see freedom preserved where it now exists and its rebirth where it does
not. The Communist agenda, on the other hand, is to exploit human suffering in
Central America to strike at the heart of the Western Hemisphere.170

President Reagan’s rhetoric aimed to motivate the U.S. public to support the
democratic passion of the El Salvadorian government against the guerilla revolutionaries.
On April 27, 1983, in his address on Central America, Reagan emphasized the rhetorical
message of the El Salvadorian people rallying together for democracy. He stated that "the
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people of El Salvador are earning their freedom and they deserve our moral and material
support to protect it,"171 and recognized that, "guerrillas are not embattled peasants armed
with muskets. They're professionals, sometimes with better training and weaponry than
the government soldier."172 He used this rhetoric because the message of working to
preserve democracy and to support America’s democratic allies against the ‘evil empire’
was the only way that he could continue to justify intervention and ensure the success of
the western-leaning government of El Salvador.
President Reagan, however, was forced to clarify his position due to the U.S.
public and Congress' continuous disinclination to intervene in developing world conflicts.
President Reagan stated, "Now before I go any further, let me say to those who invoke
the memory of Vietnam, there is no thought of sending American combat troop to Central
America. They are not needed."173 The reason why President Reagan did not need to send
soldiers to Central America is that he had already been successfully intervening by
sending military aid and intelligence, and even arranged for Latin American governments
to be trained to properly interrogate captured guerillas. More importantly, President
Reagan vocalized no thoughts of sending soldiers to Central America because he knew
the U.S. public and Congress would not approve due to Vietnam Syndrome.
By 1988, U.S. intelligence agencies such as the SAS, SOG, and GB were
providing the Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual to officers in Latin
American countries. The manual detailed how to properly interrogate a subject without
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violating international human rights laws. In fact, there was an additional disclaimer for
instructors in the introduction reading, "Prohibition Against the Use of Force. Reiterate
when discussing Non-Coercive and Coercive techniques. Ensure that the students
understand our position."174 As previously mentioned, many in the El Salvadorian
government, such as Roberto D’Aubuisson, were not opposed to committing egregious
acts against humanity. Unfortunately,
Throughout the 1980s, the war between the government, guerilla and
paramilitary forces continued to produce systematic human rights violations,
subjecting civilians to torture, mutilation, forced disappearance, extrajudicial
killing, and mass rape. Some 75,000 Salvadorans were killed by massacres,
summary executions, landmines, and indiscriminate bombing.175
Despite President Reagan’s claims to the contrary, the reality of the civil war
included mass amounts of human rights violations committed by the El Salvadorian
government, so, President Reagan's consistent rhetoric which generated an inspiring
narrative of a small government fighting for a democratic and peaceful resolution to the
war, could be construed as a lie in order to gain the support of Congress to allow
intervention. In a congressional hearing held on March 16th and 23rd in 1993 before the
subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on
the Peace Process in El Salvador, called out Reagan’s treachery when discussing torture
in El Salvador. Hon. Robert G. Torricelli stated,
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In a gesture of good faith and in the belief that it would contribute to
peace, this Congress established a process, whereby Reagan would certify that
progress was being made in respect to human rights. As a reaction to that
certification, this Congress would provide military assistance to fight the war in
El Salvador. It is now abundantly clear that Reagan made those certifications not
only in disregard of the truth but in defiance of it. Members of his administration
came forward to Congress and swore that they had no knowledge of acts of
violence. Peace was being restored and rights respected. It was a lie.176

President Reagan lied to Congress because he knew that the likelihood of ending
the human rights violations was low, especially when his own intelligence agencies were
actively aiding in the human rights abuses. Moreover, he lied to Congress about human
rights violations in El Salvador because if he did not, due to a lack of funding and the
anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome, his administration would not have
been able to intervene per containment policy, thus leaving Central America open to the
possibility of a communist revolution and breaking the long-established policy of the
Monroe Doctrine.
President Reagan supported his interventionist agenda in El Salvador through the
authorization of NSDD-82 on February 24, 1983. The Reagan administration authorized
NSDD-82 to establish a policy initiative that would help improve the prospect of victory
in El Salvador. NSDD-82 states, “The deteriorating military, economic and political
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situation in El Salvador requires immediate and concerted action to reverse current
trends…and the stage set for achieving a stable, democratic government in El
Salvador.”177 Furthermore, the Reagan administration was concentrated on making sure
that Central America and the whole of the Western hemisphere remained secure from
communist influence. In order to do this, President Reagan in NSDD-82 requested that an
immediate effort be made for an additional $60 million in military resources be sent to El
Salvador as a means to make a determined effort to ensure that Latin American peace
initiatives with the U.S. remained in place and the democratization process within Latin
America persisted.178 It is clear that the Reagan administration was deeply concerned
with the possibility of a communist insurgency in Central America which could
destabilize western security, so, in an effort to prevent this, President Reagan lied to
Congress about the human rights violations so his administration could support a
western-leaning insurgency and prevent revolutionary communist groups from gaining
power – a move that challenged the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome
with the use of tough-on-communism rhetoric. The Reagan administration continued to
disregard the re-established U.S. humanitarian image with one the of the greatest political
scandals in U.S. history: the Iran-Contra affair.
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Iran-Contra
In an attempt to maintain America’s security through the containment of
communism, President Reagan and his administration sidestepped Congress in one of the
most publicized scandals in U.S. history – the Iran-Contra scandal. Fearful that the
Sandinistas, a socialist revolutionary group that took power in Nicaragua in 1979, was
going to expand communism into Central America, President Reagan formed a plan to
support a counter-revolutionary group called the Contras. By selling weapons to Iran that
had been washed through Israel, the Reagan administration would receive funding for the
Contra’s efforts to restore containment throughout the western hemisphere, as well as
secure the rescue of hostages from the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). One problem
with the scheme, however, was the fact that the sale of weapons to Iran was illegal at the
time, due to President Reagan’s own declaration on January 19, 1984, when he labeled
Iran a state sponsor of terror. Another obstacle to the plan took place years earlier in
1982, when Congress passed the Boland Amendment that explicitly stated that, “none of
these funds provided in this act may be used by the CIA or the Department of Defense to
furnish military equipment [...] or advice [...] for the purpose of assisting that group or
individual in carrying out military activities in or against Nicaragua.”179 With the
enactment of the Boland Amendment, Congress prohibited any funding or support of the
Contra’s fight in Nicaragua. By not only making it illegal to sell weapons to Iran due to
their status on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, President Reagan and his
administration also faced the consequences of breaking the Boland Amendment as well.
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That is why when stories of a government-sanctioned secret operation began surfacing in
1986, the Reagan administration assumed the position of full denial. In an address from
Washington on November 13, 1986, President Reagan denied all accusations that he or
his administration had illegally sold or traded weapons to Iran in exchange for the release
of hostages. He stated,
The charge has been made that the United States has shipped weapons to
Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon, that the
United States undercut its allies and secretly violated American policy against
trafficking with terrorist. Those charges are utterly false. The United States has
not made concessions to those who hold our people captive in Lebanon. And we
will not. The United States has not swapped boatloads or planeloads of American
weapons for the return of American hostages. And we will not. Reports are
denied.180

President Reagan’s address in Washington is a key example of denial rhetoric – a
response that can be expected in a presidency that operated illegally behind the scenes. In
order to clear up the rumors and accusations of illegal active, President Reagan
authorized the Tower Commission to open an investigation into the Iran-Contra affair to
“have all the facts come out.”181 As it turned out, however, President Reagan was not
necessarily pleased with the commission’s report.
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On February 26, 1987, John Tower, along with Edmund Muskie and Brent
Scowcroft published their report on the Iran-Contra affair. Within their findings they
could not conclusively prove that President Reagan gave prior approval to Israel’s
transfers of arms to Iran. The Tower Commission report, however, did not exonerate
President Reagan of ensuring that Iran could not obtain weapons. The Tower
Commission states,
The President agreed to replenish Israeli stocks. We are persuaded that he
most likely provided this approval prior to the first shipments by Israel. In coming
to this conclusion, it is of paramount importance that the President never opposed
the idea of Israel transferring arms to Iran. Indeed, four months after the August
shipment, the President authorized the United States government to undertake
directly the very same operation Israel had proposed. Even if Mr. McFarlane did
not have the President’s explicit prior approval, he clearly had his full support.182
It is statements like the one above that prompted President Reagan a week later to
issue an Address to the Nation concerning the Iran-Contra affair. In his address, President
Reagan stated,
A few months ago, I told the American people I did not trade arms for
hostages. My heart and my best intentions still tell me that’s true; but the facts and
the evidence tell me it is not. As the Tower Board reported, what began as a
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strategic opening to Iran, deteriorated in its implementation into trading arms for
hostages.183

Not only did President Reagan have to admit to the nation his knowledge of the
illegal arms-deal to Iran for hostages, he also had to accept responsibility for the incident.
While President Reagan does in fact take full responsibility for what happened, he
expressed anger that the illegal activities occurred without his knowledge. President
Reagan’s statement claiming ignorance of the illegal sale of arms to Iran was in itself a
false statement. In Caspar Weinberger's declassified personal diary, General Colin Powell
relayed an encounter between the president, Schultz, Don Regan, John McMahon,
McFarland and John Poindexter, during which Powell recalled,
President wants to free hostages - Thinks Hawks and TOMs would only
go to “Moderate Elements in Army” and would help overthrow Iranian gov’t. I
argued strongly that we have an Embargo that makes Arms sales to Iran illegal
and the President couldn’t violate it and that “washing” transaction through Israel
wouldn’t make it legal, Schultz, Don Regan agreed, President said he could
answer to charges of illegality but he couldn’t answer charge that “big strong
President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages.184
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From this personal transcript, it is clear that not only was President Reagan aware
that his actions were illegal, but he did not act alone. Furthermore, in a memorandum
from a meeting on November 10, 1986 in the oval office, it was stated that Congress
could and probably would hold legislative hearings.185 President Reagan risked charges
of illegality because his tough on communism rhetoric could not endure the criticism of
failing to freeing hostages held in Lebanon – criticism that President Carter had to endure
from Reagan and his party for Carter’s failure to solve the hostage crisis, which
ultimately, helped Reagan win the election.
President Reagan, with his revisionist narrative mindset, authorized illegal covert
actions because of the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome that applied
unnecessary restrictions on U.S. foreign policy. Or as Michael Kinsley in his article,
"From Rambo to Platoon," states, "The relationship between Platoon and the Iran scandal
is not that the scandal changed public attitudes and made the movie popularity possible.
It's that the public's attitude towards war, as tapped by Platoon, is what drove the Reagan
administration to conduct an illegal war in secret, which led to the scandal."186 Kinsley’s
statement supports the claim that President Reagan and his administration covertly sold
weapons to Iran in exchange for hostages and funding for the Contras in Central America
due to the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome.
Another example of President Reagan’s rhetoric turned to action occurred on July
28, 1983, when he authorized NSDD-100 which called for the enhancement of U.S.
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military activity and assistance in Central America. President Reagan established NSDD100 in response to “The consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua,
committed to the export of violence and totalitarianism, pose a significant risk to the
stability of Central America.”187 The Reagan administration believed that the stability and
security of the western hemisphere per the Monroe Doctrine would be compromised
should the communist group’s actions go unchecked. That is why NSDD-100 called for
adequate U.S. support be provided to the democratic resistance forces within Nicaragua,
to ensure that Nicaragua ceases to be a Soviet/Cuban base.188 With the Boland
Amendment in full effect, however, President Reagan and his administration had to sidestep Congress and illegally sell weapons to Iran to not only free hostages, but to help
support the democratic resistance forces in Nicaragua as called for in NSDD-100. Further
pressing his foreign policy objectives in Central America, President Reagan authorized
yet another national security decision. On February 7, 1984, NSDD-124 established the
four objectives the U.S. had in Central America; supporting the advancement of
democracy and free electoral processes in all Central American countries, supporting the
economic development and humanitarian assistance to raise the standard of living in
Central America, promoting the resolution of regional disputes through dialogue and
negotiation, and providing sufficient security for the safety of democratic institutions and
social reforms from communist subversion.189 NSDD-124 built upon the previously
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established NSDD-100 by further establishing U.S. objectives and intervention within the
Central America crisis. As the crisis in Central America continued to jeopardize vital
U.S. interests, President Reagan also continued to enforce an interventionist foreign
policy within Central America.
President Reagan’s Central American foreign policy trend continued to follow the
same goals and objective established under NSDD-124 with the authorization of NSDD225 on May 20, 1986. Directly citing NSDD-124 and U.S. objectives in Central America,
NSDD-225 specifically listed U.S. objectives within Nicaragua. Termination of
Nicaragua’s support of Marxist/Leninist subversion, removal of Soviet bloc/Cuban
personnel from the region, an end to Nicaraguan military cooperation with communist
countries, and the reduction of the Sandinista military apparatuses in the area were all
primary objectives set forth inNSDD-225.190 The directive further stated that in pursuit of
those objectives, all U.S. government agencies had to keep in mind the importance of the
overall goal to secure aid for Nicaragua’s democratic resistance.191 NSDD-225
demonstrated that President Reagan was fully aware that his administration had not only
continued to procure funding to help support the democratic resistance forces in
Nicaragua, but the use and implementation of those funds by U.S. agencies had to be in
line with maintaining credible diplomatic avenues. With the continued antiinterventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome influencing policies like the Boland
Amendment, President Reagan was put in the position where he and his administration
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had to lie to Congress about human rights violation in El Salvador and the illegal sale of
weapons to Iran to fund Nicaraguan democratic resistance forces; and he did that to stay
true to his tough on communist rhetoric, side-step the effects of the Vietnam Syndrome,
and uphold his and his administration’s established foreign policy objectives.
Chapter Two Conclusion
From Ford to Reagan, presidents and their administrations viewed the Vietnam
Syndrome and its anti-interventionist effects as an enemy to defeat, and in order to do so,
each president used different rhetorical messages to re-establish America’s faith in its
leadership and remove the shackles of the Vietnam Syndrome on U.S. foreign policy. The
first to address the limiting effects of the Vietnam Syndrome, President Ford, wrapped
his foreign policy in the dual narrative of healing the nation’s wounds but from a position
of strength. He knew that if the U.S. remained disjointed and the wounds of the Vietnam
War left untreated, the U.S. would not be able to protect its vital interests abroad.
Following Ford’s popular rhetoric, President Carter’s rhetorical message sought to reestablish the U.S. image as the peace brokers of the world.
After the horrific events of the Vietnam War, the U.S. public, Congress, and the
international world alike questioned America’s commitment to peace and freedom. By reestablishing America’s humanitarian image, Carter proved that the U.S. could
successfully uphold its Wilsonian principles, unlike his successor, President Reagan.
In an attempt to satisfy the anti-interventionist needs of the U.S. public and
Congress, as well as the interventionist needs of his administration, President Reagan
used a specifically targeted rhetorical message that comprised of directly attacking the
Vietnam Syndrome, promoting peace through strength, and branding the Soviet Union as
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the ‘evil empire’ which contextualized his foreign policy objectives in a way that best
resonated with the America people and Congress at the time. Eventually, President
Reagan opposed both Congress and the newly re-established humanitarian image, to fund
and support covert operations against communist insurgencies in areas such as Central
America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, which required established foreign policy
objectives to challenge the lasting anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome.
As expressed earlier in Holsti and Rosenau’s study, a consensus among U.S.
leadership on U.S. foreign policy had not been achieved by President Reagan’s second
term in 1986. However, by January 1991, President H.W. Bush was able to create a
consensus among leaders if only temporarily, to pass the declaration of war against Iraq.
Chapter three will examine how President H.W. Bush was able to sell the Persian Gulf
war as a means to ‘kick’ the lasting effects of the Vietnam Syndrome on foreign policy,
allowing the U.S. to once again employ major military intervention as a means to protect
national security interests abroad.
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CHAPTER THREE: KICKING THE VIETNAM SYNDROME
“It’s a proud day for America. And, by God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome
once and for all.”192

This statement made by President H.W. Bush on March 1, 1991 in his speech to
the American Legislative Exchange Council is not only one of the most quintessential
references to the Vietnam Syndrome made by any president but served also as a
declaration that the New World Order had been a success. Up until August of 1990
however, both Congress and the U.S. public remained steadfast in their antiinterventionist position due to the lingering anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam
Syndrome. Therefore, the question can be posed: how did the Bush administration create
a consensus on an interventionist U.S. foreign policy and effectively ‘kick’ the antiinterventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome?
President Bush understood that his administration needed to end the Vietnam
Syndrome since it prevented the U.S. from intervening in global conflicts, especially
within developing countries, and with the New World Order predicated on coalition
intervention, the Vietnam Syndrome would have to be ‘kicked’ in order for it work. That
is why as a means of defeating the lasting anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam
Syndrome, the Bush administration and U.S. military sold the Persian Gulf War to the
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U.S. public, Congress, and the UN as a ‘just’ war with the rhetoric of the New World
Order and the implementation of a media propaganda campaign, which effectively
created a consensus on foreign policy through the interventionist New World Order
policy. By selling the ‘just’ war narrative, the Bush administration not only created a
consensus on U.S. foreign policy, but it contributed significantly towards combatting the
Vietnam Syndrome by breaking Congress’s anti-interventionist stance. Furthermore, the
Bush administration, along with General Powell and the U.S. military, further ‘kicked’
the Vietnam Syndrome by attempting to right the mistakes of the Vietnam War. This
included, enhancing media pooling within the Gulf, returning to the effective strategies of
WWII with the implementation of the Powell Doctrine, which maintained clear-cut
objectives within the Gulf that were effectively communicated to the U.S. public. By
selling the Persian Gulf War as a ‘just’ war through a media propaganda campaign which
garnered support for an interventionist policy of the New World Order in the Gulf,
President Bush addressed some of the perceived mistakes committed during the Vietnam
War. In doing so, the Bush administration effectively ‘kicked’ the anti-interventionist
effects of the Vietnam Syndrome and re-established the security of western interests
through the collective security of the New World Order.
President George H.W. Bush: New World Order Rhetoric
Taking office on January 20, 1989, then Vice President, now President George
H.W. Bush sought to re-establish the U.S. as the global leader in collective security.
President Bush was the first of the post-Vietnam presidents that did not have to handle, at
least for most of his presidency, the looming threat of the Cold War and the potential
ramifications of confronting another global superpower. On December 25, 1991, the
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Soviet Union officially collapsed, leaving western democracy and the U.S. victorious.
However, prior to the Soviet’s collapse, he focused his time and attention on talks of
strategic arms limitations with President Gorbachev.
During his tenure as vice president to President Reagan, while Reagan pursued a
more interventionist foreign policy, Bush held long deliberations with the Soviet Union
on strategic arms control. That is why it comes as no surprise why those in Congress and
amongst the U.S. public favored Bush's détente strategy of containment with the Soviet
Union. From the December 1989 summit in Malta to the June 1990 summit in
Washington D.C., Bush and Gorbachev met frequently throughout his first years as
president to discuss nuclear disarmament. However, it was not until July 1991 that both
Bush and Gorbachev came together in Moscow to sign the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty or START.193 Only four months later, President Gorbachev stepped down as
president of the Soviet Union marking the end of the ‘evil empire.’ With the Cold War
concluded, and the threat of Soviet repercussions neutralized, President Bush was able to
focus his attention on a new rising enemy in the Gulf, which contained the ideal testing
ground for his New World Order rhetoric.
With domestic and Congressional support high for Bush, the U.S. seemed
confident in his ability to conduct foreign policy. Testing that confidence, on August 8,
1990, Bush addressed the nation on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, calling for the U.S. to
once again assume the mantle as the global leader of the free world. Harking back to the
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rhetoric of WWII, Bush hoped to capitalize on what Isaacs called the “the last good
war.”194 Bush first used his rhetorical message of the New World Order in his Address on
Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait, where he stated, “we’re beginning a new era. This new era can
be full promise, an age of freedom, a time of peace for all peoples. But if history teaches
us anything, it is that we must resist aggression, or it will destroy our freedoms.
Appeasement does not work.”195 Praised early in presidency for his détente policy of
strategic arms limitations, Bush switched tactics, no doubt due to the collapse of the
Soviet Union, to a stronger position where the U.S. could openly condemn Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait. President Bush’s rhetorical message of the New World Order
justified America’s commitment to confront global acts of aggression.
On September 11, 1990, President Bush addressed Congress once again on the
persistent aggression of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi army’s push towards Saudi
Arabia. Defining America’s intentions earlier on, Bush sought to be as clear as possible
regarding U.S. intentions in the Gulf and his decision to send elements of the 82nd
Airborne to the Gulf. Clear objectives were crucial since much of the U.S. public and
Congress were still against military intervention. That is why Bush framed his more
aggressive foreign policy in the context of the U.S. assuming leadership of the New
World Order, which was the late 20th century’s reinstatement of Wilsonianism. Bush
stated,
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Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective—a new world order—can
emerge: a new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of
justice, and more secure in the quest for peace… Today that new world is
struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world
where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations
recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice… The test we face is
great, and so are the stakes. This is the first assault on the new world that we seek,
the first test of our mettle. Had we not responded to this first provocation with
clarity of purpose, if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination, it
would be a signal to actual and potential despots around the world. America and
the world must defend common vital interests—and we will. America and the
world must support the rule of law—and we will. America and the world must
stand up to aggression.196
President Bush’s New World Order rhetoric was an effective and idealistic
message that both the American public and Congress could support. As Saddam Hussein
continued to ignore the U.S. and international community’s call to retreat and cease all
aggression, Congress felt obligated to break its tradition of nearly fifteen years of antiinterventionist policy to once again authorize the U.S. military to directly intervene
against Saddam’s naked aggression. On January 12, 1991, with a vote of 250-183 in the
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House and a much closer vote of 52-47 in the Senate, President Bush’s rhetoric proved
successful and allowed the U.S. to once again be willing to use force to protect its
national security interests abroad.197
With the U.S. public, Congress, and the United Nations behind him, the Bush
administration launched a significant show of force against the aggression of Saddam
Hussein. Exercising each objective with professionalism and determination, the U.S.
Armed Forces pushed Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait in less than
four days of combat. On February 27, 1991, in his speech announcing the end of the Gulf
War, President Bush highlighted the exceptional efforts of the U.S. and coalition forces
and spoke to the success of the New World Order: “I am pleased to announce that at
midnight tonight eastern standard time, exactly 100 hours since ground operations
commenced and 6 weeks since the start of Desert Storm, all United States and coalition
forces will suspend offensive combat operations.”198 In alignment with his rhetorical
messaging, President Bush didn’t claim the win as an unilateral American win, as was the
intention for the Vietnam War, but as a global win against aggression. His goal of
establishing the New World Order had been achieved: “No one country can claim this
victory as its own. It was not only a victory for Kuwait but a victory for all the coalition
partners. This is a victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law, and
for what is right.”199 With America back at the helm of global security, the Bush
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administration could lead the world into a new era – an era of laws, rules, and
international order. Using more than his New World Order rhetoric to garner a consensus
on interventionist foreign policy, the Bush administration framed the Persian Gulf War
into the only terms they could use to gain support – fighting the ‘just’ war.
Using The ‘Just’ War Narrative: President H.W. Bush’s Propaganda Campaign To
Form A Congressional Consensus
The key objective of the Bush administration was to re-establish global security
and international law through a revitalized U.N. per the New World Order. To provide
global security and enforce international law however, member nations had to be willing
to intervene in international conflicts, often within developing world, post-colonial
countries. The reality of an apprehensive Congress and a nation held hostage by the
lingering anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome forced the Bush
administration to recognize that the success or failure of the New World Order depended
on their ability to rid the populace of the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam
Syndrome. That is why President Bush launched a media manipulation and propaganda
campaign that focused on human atrocity stories and branding Saddam Hussein as the
new Adolf Hitler so they could frame the Persian Gulf War as a ‘just’ war, the only type
of war the American people and the U.N. could support. In doing so, the Bush
administration sold the war to the American people, Congress, and the U.N. which
allowed President Bush the opportunity to showcase the collective security of the New
World Order in action.
In order to sell the Persian Gulf War within the ‘just’ war framework, the Bush
administration believed that media manipulation was necessary to rally support for an
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aggressive war option which was most certainly the backbone of the New World Order.
Media manipulation was made easy when the company hired to cover the war turned out
to be deeply connected politically to the government that hired them. Jarol B. Manheim’s
article, “Strategically Public Diplomacy,” published in Taken by Storm, reveals that
weeks before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Hill and Knowlton (H&K) merged with a
consulting firm by the name of Wexler, Reynolds, Fuller, Harrison and Schule, after
which, Craig Fuller took command of H&K’s Washington branch. Craig Fuller had
previously served as Chief of Staff to the Vice President of the United States at the time,
George H.W. Bush. Even after Fuller left his position as Chief of Staff, he maintained a
connection to the White House, a connection strong enough for Fuller to be asked to
organize the 1992 Republican National Convention that re-elected his former boss.
Additionally, Fuller frequently visited the White House to discuss political strategies
prior to the Iraqi invasion. Fuller stated, “Getting [the Kuwaiti’s] message across was
completely in line with the goals of the Bush administration. By helping the Kuwaiti
citizens, it was clear we would be helping the Bush administration.”200 With a close
connection to the White House and a personal relationship with the president, H&K was
willing to go so far as to fabricate stories of war crimes to help sell the ‘just’ war
narrative.
In an effort to sell the ‘just’ war narrative of the Gulf War to Congress and the
U.N., the Bush administration, along with H&K, conjured up a narrative that sought to
motivate Congress and U.N. action against Saddam’s aggression. The narrative
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originated from a young Kuwaiti girl by the name of Nayirah Al-Sabah who testified
before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus that she personally witnessed Iraqi
troops committing atrocious human rights violations. In her testimony she states,
I volunteered at eh al-Addan hospital with twelve other women… While I
was there, I saw the Iraqi soldiers come into the hospital with a gun and go into
the room where 15 babies were in incubators. They took the babies out of the
incubators, took the incubators, and left the children to die on the cold floor. It
was horrifying.201
The personal testimony of Nayirah before the Congressional Human Rights
Caucus quickly created an outcry within both Congress and the U.N. to condemn
Saddam’s barbarity. Her testimony proved vital in persuading the U.N. to send coalition
forces to confront Saddam with the United States at the helm. On November 29, 1990,
only six weeks after Nayirah testified, the U.N. adopted Resolution 678 that “Authorizes
Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait to use all necessary means
to uphold and implement Resolution 660 and all subsequent resolutions and to restore
international peace and security in the area.”202 Nayirah’s testimony, however, was later
deemed false by an independent study done by Amnesty International in 1991 and was
cited in a Congressional Record to disqualify Hill and Knowlton’s very own Lauri FitzPegado from her nomination for Assistant Secretary of Commerce for her part in
coaching Nayirah’s fabricated testimony. The Congressional Record stated,
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Nayirah's emotional testimony riveted human rights organizations, the
news media, and the Nation. That incident was cited by six Members of the
Senate as reason to go to war with Iraq […] Since then, every reputable human
rights organization and journalist has concluded that the baby incubator story was
an outright fabrication. Terrible things were done by the Iraqis, but Nayirah never
saw what she said she saw.203
Not to minimize the reality of atrocities that were indeed committed by the Iraqi
regime, Nayirah’s story certainly provided a useful piece of manipulation and propaganda
that helped sell the ‘just’ war narrative for military intervention. Douglas Kellner
parallels this idea in his book, The Persian Gulf TV War, in which he claims, “This baby
atrocity story was, therefore, a classic propaganda campaign to manufacture consent for
the Bush administration policies.”204
Even though many of the stories of Iraqi atrocities used to persuade Congress and
the U.N. to intervene proved to be nothing more than propaganda tools, they still
managed to get Resolution 678 passed, and with it, the opportunity for the Bush
administration to prove the effectiveness of the New World Order. With Congress and the
U.N. ready for action, the Bush administration sought to provide the U.S. public with an
enemy against whom they could rally against.
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In a study conducted by H&K, they discovered that the American people did not
respond as sympathetically to stories of Iraqi atrocities as they did to making an enemy
out of Saddam. H&K ultimately concluded that the best strategy for focusing the U.S.
public’s attention towards intervention was to not only broadcast the atrocities of the
Iraqi regime but to demonize Saddam Hussein as well.205 With Saddam Hussein’s
infamous human rights violations record, President H.W. Bush and his administration
sought to link Saddam to an iconic symbol of evil from world history to convey the
severity of the threat in the Middle East.
The Bush administration along with H&K used a World War II icon, Adolf Hitler,
and compared him to Iraq’s dictator, legitimizing Saddam Hussein as a global threat that
could not go unchecked. By fashioning Saddam Hussein into the modern-day persona of
Hitler, President H.W. Bush was able to spin the Gulf War as a “moral and just war.”206
Twisting the Gulf War into a moral war with the primary aim to defeat the modern-day
Hitler was exactly the kind of ideology the American people could unify behind.
Focusing on Kuwaiti atrocity stories and personifying Saddam as the new Hitler were
attempts to use the ‘just’ war framework to sell the Gulf War. President H.W. Bush also
mirrored the attitudes of ‘hawks’ within his committee that insisted Saddam was an
emerging Hitler who needed to be toppled before he became more dangerous to western
interests.207 President Bush, however, also took into consideration the feeling of the many
‘doves’ within his committee that felt that the Persian Gulf War could evolve into a trap
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like Vietnam, with the same outcomes. Ultimately, President Bush was able to persuade
the U.S. public as well as many within Congress and other western leaders of the U.N. to
accept the World War II analogy as sound with the pragmatic implication of following up
with war.208 President Bush himself even equated Saddam’s actions to Hitler’s in a
speech given at the Gubernatorial Luncheon Fundraiser on October 15, 1990:
I heard horrible tales: Newborn babies thrown out of incubators and the
incubators then shipped off to Baghdad. Dialysis patients ripped from their
machines, and those machines then, too, sent off Baghdad. The story of two
young kinds passing out leaflet: Iraqi troops rounded up their parents and made
them watch while those two kids were shot to death- executed before their eyes.
Hitler revisited. But remember, when Hitler’s war ended, there were the
Nuremberg trials.209
By connecting Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler, both the America people and the
international community were made to understand the magnitude of the situation
occurring within the Middle East. If gone unchecked, Saddam had the capability to hold
the world’s energy hostage and demand global power and recognition. Recalling the days
of World War II, in which the world’s nations came together to defeat the evils of Nazi
fascism, the New World Order offered an opportunity for Congress, the U.N., and the
U.S. public to rally together against the aggression of Hitler’s reincarnation.
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President Bush’s application of the ‘just’ war narrative did have its shortcomings,
however. In his work, Selling A ‘Just’ War, Michael Butler critiqued President Bush's
failure to adequately frame the Persian Gulf War within the terms of a ‘just’ war
framework. Butler claims that "The most accurate characterization of the application of
the just war frame in the Gulf War crisis, then, is of a frame that is undoubtedly
employed with intent but incoherently."210 Butler focused on two primary dimensions for
Bush's incoherent use of the ‘just’ war narrative: inconsistency in the application of the
narrative, and lack of a substantive message. First, early on before the start of the war,
President Bush based his strong ‘just’ war message on the Nayirah testimony and
Saddam as the new Hitler analogy, but shortly after the war began, he moved onto an
underwhelming series of speeches to military families that did not utilize the ‘just’ war
narrative. By failing to focus on the ‘just’ war narrative consistently through the entirety
of the Persian Gulf War, President Bush did not enforce a clear ‘just’ war narrative
according to Butler.
Second, President Bush failed to enforce a clear ‘just’ war narrative due to his
lack of a substantive message. Besides his use of the ‘just’ war framework, President
Bush was also intent on selling other facets of the war that were nonessential to the ‘just’
war framework including the messaging of ‘kicking’ the Vietnam Syndrome and
advancing the New World Order.211 Since neither of these messages was central to or
reflective of a ‘just’ war, Butler concludes that the Bush administration strayed from the
‘just’ war message which confused the intentions behind the overall sale of the Persian
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Gulf War. Even though Bush’s use of the ‘just’ war narrative was inconsistent, it had
proven effective enough to gain the support of Congress, the UN, and the U.S. public,
which ultimately created a consensus on foreign policy with the establishment of the New
World Order. Recognizing the thin majority of support for the war, and the devastating
toll that the media took during Vietnam, the Bush administration knew that if they were
going to maintain public support for the entirety of the war, they needed to control and
manipulate the information leaving the Persian Gulf.
Enhancing Domestic Policy: U.S. Military Censorship Through Media Pooling
President H.W. Bush and his administration not only used the collective security
rhetoric of the New World Order, but they also used the humanitarian propaganda of
H&K and the branding of Saddam Hussein as the reincarnated Adolf Hitler, in an attempt
to frame the Persian Gulf War into a ‘just’ war. The Bush administration also used these
methods to gain support and ultimately a consensus on U.S foreign policy with the
authorization of military intervention in the Gulf, which they knew would be backed by
the U.N. However, gaining a consensus on interventionist foreign policy through the New
World Order only resulted in authorization from Congress to go to war. If the global
security of the New World Order was to truly ‘kick’ the Vietnam Syndrome, it would
have to successfully meet each of the established objectives in the Gulf. In order to do
this, the Bush administration enhanced the U.S. media pooling system within the Gulf as
a means to not only control the narrative coming out of the Kuwaiti theater, but also to fix
the all-access media catastrophe of the Vietnam War, which fueled the anti-war
movement. By controlling the U.S. media through the media pooling system, the Bush
administration was also able to continue framing the Persian Gulf War in terms of the
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‘just’ war narrative, which further garnered Congressional and U.S. public support for the
collective security of the New World Order. Media pools also helped ensure the support
of both Congress and the American populace for the Persian Gulf War, otherwise, if
Congress or the U.S. public turned against the war, or if the New World Order failed to
defeat Saddam Hussein, the Vietnam Syndrome would persist.
The use of media pooling within the Persian Gulf War was not an unheard-of
wartime maneuver. Media pooling became a popular U.S. policy after the Vietnam War.
The all-access live footage and photographs of the Vietnam War captured by the U.S.
media that fueled the anti-war protests made the coverage of any U.S. intervention postVietnam comply with strict military review and censorship. Used in Grenada, Lebanon,
and Panama, media pooling, by the time of the Persian Gulf War, had become effective at
controlling the movement and access of reporters and reports from the theater. However,
in the case of the Persian Gulf War, with the success of the New World Order and the
objective to ‘kick’ the Vietnam Syndrome on the line, the Bush administration took no
chances.
The Bush administration along with the U.S. military enhanced the already
effective media pooling system by drastically limiting the number of reporters allowed in
the theater, limiting coverage areas, material, interviews, censoring reports, and enforcing
twenty-four-hour military escorts. The Los Angeles Times reported that, “Not only did all
news dispatchers have to clear a ‘security review’ not required since the Korean War, but
reporters had to travel in organized pools and be accompanied at all times by military
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escort. Journalist said that these escorts often acted as censors.”212 Many major media
outlets such as the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times publicly opposed such
strict access to war reporting. In a report sent to Secretary of State Dick Cheney
composed by CNN, ABC, the Washington Post and other major media companies
requested that the Persian Gulf War not become the standard model for future war
coverage, especially since the report cited cases of reporters being threatened, being
placed under military arrest by American troops, and having their reports ‘sanitized’ for
political reasons rather than military.213 The negative effects of the enhanced media
pooling system were repercussions of maintaining a ‘just’ war narrative and ensuring
continued Congressional and U.S. public support for the war. In fact, the Bush
administration and the U.S. military bolstered the media pooling system to the point
where the U.S. media claimed that during the Persian Gulf War the Pentagon imposed the
tightest restrictions on press coverage in American military history.214 By imposing such
historic restrictions on media coverage of the war, the Bush administration and U.S.
military were able to ensure that the Vietnam quagmire was not repeated, securing the
success of the New World Order.
Following similar sentiments as the previous report, The Los Angeles Times
continued to criticize the enhanced media pooling system and its intentions. In his news
article, “Pool Reporting: There’s Good News and Bad News,” John Balzar directly
connected the Bush administration and U.S. military’s intentions behind enforcing the

Thomas B. Rosenstiel, “Gulf War No Model for Coverage, Media Tells Pentagon,” The Los Angeles
Times, July 1, 1991.
213
Rosenstiel, “Gulf War No Model for Coverage, Media Tells Pentagon.”
214
Rosenstiel, “Gulf War No Model for Coverage, Media Tells Pentagon.”
212

118

media pooling system to the lessons learned from Vietnam. Balzar states,
Many of the procedures in the Persian Gulf War, including the
requirement that all press pools be escorted by a military public affair
professional, clearly reflect the military’s widespread belief that the free-ranging
tone and vivid details of Vietnam coverage contributed to the anti-war movement
in the United States.215

Balzar’s statement confirms that the Bush administration and U.S. military were
consciously implementing an enhanced media pools system within the Gulf to address the
mistakes made during the Vietnam War coverage.
Fixing the widespread media coverage mistake from the Vietnam War was only
one objective of the media pooling system. Jason DeParle, author of the news article,
“Long Series of Military Decisions Led to Gulf War News Censorship,” linked the Bush
administration and U.S. military’s interference with the media pooling system to the
support of specific political objectives of the war. DeParle states, “The drafting of Annex
Foxtrot was one step in a long march of decisions that, by war’s end, left the Government
with a dramatically changed policy on press coverage of military operations.”216 DeParle
continued on with, “The policy began with a decision by the administration most senior
officials, including President Bush, to manage the information flow in a way that
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supported the operation’s political goals and avoid the perceived mistakes of
Vietnam.”217 DeParle’s news article supports Balzar’s claim that the Bush administration
and U.S. military were consciously implementing the media pooling system within the
Gulf to not only support the war’s objectives but to also address the mistakes from
Vietnam.
Michael R. Gordon, elaborated further on the media’s criticisms of the Pentagon’s
enforcement of the media pooling system in his New York Times article, “Pentagon Seeks
Tight Limits on Reporters in Gulf War.” According to Gordon, the Pentagon reported
that the restrictions would be necessary to protect the security of American military
operations in the gulf and to guard the individual privacy of American troops.218 Several
media executives, however, responded to the Pentagon claiming that “The rules were
excessive. They said the restrictions appeared to be aimed at preventing politically
damaging disclosures by soldiers and at shielding the America public from the
consequences of war.”219 Gordon’s news article follows a line of other reports that
corroborate the claim that the enhanced media pooling system in the Gulf was put in
place not only to manage the political narrative coming from the Gulf from any damaging
press, but to also protect the U.S. public from negative consequences of the war. Further
shielding the U.S public and Congress from the consequences of war through the media
pooling system, the Bush administration, along with the U.S. military continued to
tighten restrictions on not just news reports but, film and photography of the war as well.
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An anonymous news article published in the New York Times titled “Restriction
on War Photos” provides an explanation for the strict censorship of photos and film
during the Persian Gulf War. The news article states that “Out of concern for the next of
kin, the Pentagon has issued guidelines prohibiting photographers covering the war in the
Persian Gulf from taking or transmitting pictures in which the faces of the wounded or
dead might be recognizable, and a result few if any photos of American casualties were
taken.”220 In fact, Scott Applewhite, an A.P. photographer in the theater, reported to the
anonymous author that some photographers had been bypassing the pooling system and
taking pictures independently which severely annoyed the military authorities to the point
where several reporters had their credentials revoked.221 Such strict policy enforcement of
the media pooling system within the Gulf, especially when it came to photos of combat
injuries or deaths, was a direct attempt by the Bush administration as well as the U.S.
military to prevent another Napalm Girl moment.222 By instituting strict regulations and
restrictions on the U.S media through the media pooling system, the Bush administration
and the U.S. military were able to correct the perceived media mistakes of the past and
maintain that reports of the war adhered to political objectives of the New World Order
and the ‘just’ war narrative. With the most significant mistake from Vietnam remedied,
the Bush administration along with the U.S. military sought to mend other failed
strategies, such as incremental deployments223 and unclear objectives.
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Addressing Additional Mistakes From The Vietnam War: The Powell Doctrine And
Bush’s Clear-Cut Objectives
Controlling the media was a necessity for the Bush administration to not only
frame the war in terms that were favorable to both the U.S. military and the government,
but to ensure the success of the New World Order. Making a return to past successes, in a
decision supported by the Bush administration, the U.S. military commanded by General
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Bush administration, Colin Powell,
scrapped the strategy of incremental deployments and embraced the tried and true
deployment strategies from World War II. The Powell Doctrine, combined with President
H.W. Bush's clear-cut objectives supported by a coalition force, allowed the New World
Order to address several other mistakes made during the Vietnam War.
Returning to the Blitzkrieg military strategy of WWII, the media labeled the
Powell Doctrine the backbone of the Persian Gulf War. The Powell Doctrine was based
on the premise that when the U.S. used its military force it did so with overwhelming
force, only in the service of vital national security interests, and only after an extensive
statistical cost-benefit analysis which provided policymakers with realistic political
objectives.224 The Powell Doctrine is a strategy that could win over the U.S. public since
it provided the peace of mind of a defined exit strategy, preventing a potentially long
drawn out quagmire.225 The removal of incremental deployments that caused a lack of
unit cohesiveness, combined with the addition of statistical support for estimating vital
interests with a clear exit strategy were all ways in which the Powell Doctrine sought to
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fix the strategic mistakes of the Vietnam War. The Powell Doctrine was further
predicated on an "interest-based decision to intervene based on a catalog of criteria for
the proper execution of military intervention."226 Besides a clear exit strategy and the
requirement of acting in the nation’s best interests, other criteria included the number of
troops deployed, which had to correspond to their mission, the consistent re-evaluation of
the size, composition, and disposition of the troops, and the stipulation that the operation
required the support from both Congress and the U.S. public.227 In his article for the Los
Angeles Times, “Putting the Vietnam Syndrome to Rest,” Harry Summers Jr. commented
on the end of the Vietnam Syndrome and how the Powell Doctrine helped President Bush
‘kick’ its lasting effects. He stated,
The payoff of all this training was Operation Desert Strom and the
blitzkrieg that destroyed Hussein’s army. An old joke best explained by Gen. H
Norman Schwarzkopf’s miraculous victory: ‘How do you get to Carnegie Hall?’
asked a tourist, Schwarzkopf replied, ‘Practice, man, practice.’”228

Summers not only referenced the strategies of World War II in the application of
the Powell Doctrine in the Gulf, but also simultaneously highlighted the U.S. military’s
remediation of strategic mistakes of the Vietnam War. In support of the Powell Doctrine
and its strategy, President Bush openly communicated to Congress and the U.S. public,
the goals and objectives of the Persian Gulf War and how they lined up with the New
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World Order.
In a show of full support of the Powell Doctrine and presenting a united
front between the White House, the U.S. military, and Congress, an image that had been
lost during the Vietnam War, President Bush informed the country of America’s decision
to intervene in the Gulf. On August 8, 1990, President Bush announced in his Address on
Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait, that he had commanded the 82nd Airborne Division as well as
several key U.S. Air Force detachments to Saudi Arabia to take up a defensive position
against Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Army.229 Once again drawing a parallel to World
War II, Bush condemned the Iraqi military’s blitzkrieg invasion of Kuwait, all the while
though as he prepared for a blitzkrieg of his own with Operation Desert Storm. He stated
early in his speech the clear objectives of the war:

Four simple principles guide our policy. First, we seek the immediate,
unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second,
Kuwaiti's legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime.
And third, my administration, as has been the case with every President from
President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is committed to the security and stability
of the Persian Gulf. And fourth, I am determined to protect the lives of American
citizens abroad.230

By listing clear and direct objectives, President Bush directly communicated to
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the U.S. public his exact reasons for deciding to intervene as well as his support for the
Powell Doctrine which ultimately proved successful against Saddam and permitted the
success of the New World Order. President Bush clarified his decision to intervene in the
Gulf further by stating:
Let me be clear: The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital
interest to the United States. This decision, which I share with congressional
leadership, grows out of longstanding friendship and security relationship
between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.231
Driving his point home, President Bush concluded with,

I want to be clear about what we are doing and why. America does not
seek conflict, nor do we seek to chart the destiny of other nations. But America
will stand by her friends. The mission of our troops is wholly defensive.
Hopefully, they will not be needed long.232

President Bush’s objective early in the war was to be clear and distinct with the
goals and objectives of the war and provide continued reassurance of U.S. intentions in
the Gulf, something that had been amiss during the Vietnam War. Bush also aimed to
mirror the objectives of the Powell Doctrine and demonstrate his support and
commitment to a unified strategy. His rhetorical support for the Powell Doctrine not only
went a long way to fixing the mistakes of Vietnam but to the ultimate victory over
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Saddam and the Iraqi regime.
President Bush’s desire from his August 8th speech that the war would end
swiftly and the soldiers would not need to remain in the Gulf for long ultimately came
true. Declared one of the quickest and most decisive wars in U.S. history, the Persian
Gulf War in its entirety lasted less than a year, and the time spent in actual combat was
even less. Per President Bush’s February 27th 1991 address at the end of the Gulf War:
"Exactly 100 hours since ground operations commenced and 6 weeks since the start of
Desert Storm, all United States and coalition forces will suspend offensive combat
operations."233 He opened his victory address by directly stating that all U.S. objectives in
the Gulf had been met. Kuwait had been liberated, the Iraqi army defeated, all military
objectives were met, and the legitimate government of Kuwait was re-instated and back
in the hands of the Kuwaitis.234 With all objectives met, President Bush infamously
declared, “America and the world drew a line in the sand. We declared that the
aggression against Kuwait would not stand. And tonight, America and the world have
kept their word.”235 By fixing the media issue leftover from Vietnam through stricter
media pooling and limited coverage material, successfully selling the ‘just’ war narrative
of the war to gain support from Congress, the U.S. public and the U.N., and fixing the
strategic military issues by implementing the Powell Doctrine and employing coalition
forces, the trial run of the New World Order had proved successful, helping ‘kick’ the
Vietnam Syndrome and re-establish America’s ability to intervene in developing world
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conflicts. Approval for the Gulf War from both Congress and the U.N. allowed the Bush
administration to create a consensus on U.S. foreign policy in the New World Order, and
support from the U.S. public played a significant part in ‘kicking’ the Vietnam Syndrome
by realtering the Vietnam Era’s cultural shift of war back to one with a favorable view of
intervention.
Realtering The Cultural Shift Of War And The Yellow Ribbion Movement
From President Ford to President H.W. Bush, every post-Vietnam era president
did his part to try and alter the U.S. public’s collective cultural view of war back towards
an aggressive interventionist agenda. However, it was not until Bush’s presidency that the
U.S. public’s cultural view would be challenged with the upcoming Persian Gulf War.
That is why President Bush not only used fake atrocity stories and Hitler analogies to
provide evidence, but he also used the personal stories of soldiers and a National Victory
Celebration Military Parade that honored returning soldiers to create support for soldiers
and the U.S. military. In doing so, President Bush fixed another lingering issue from the
Vietnam War and fostered a positive image of the U.S. military in the eyes of the
American public and garnered significant support for the war, but especially for the
troops. President Bush’s rhetoric proved enough to alter America’s collective cultural
view of war towards intervention with nationwide efforts to support soldiers like the
yellow ribbon movement which countered the shouts of protesters of the war. The
movement that equated anti-war protests to anti-soldier sentiments effectively
demonstrated the U.S. public’s realtered cultural view of war.
First emerging throughout the U.S. in 1981 as a sign of support for the hostages
still held in Iran, the yellow ribbon movement became a nationwide symbol of
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recognition and support. The movement was not limited to supporting hostages overseas,
however, as its core message of support made it applicable to any ‘just’ cause. President
Bush's patriotic fervor and willingness to lead by example and his call to the American
people to support the war against naked aggression led to the emergence of yellow
ribbons in support of soldiers overseas. In fact, during the Persian Gulf War, the yellow
ribbon movement took on yet another representation: anti-protest. Since President Bush
needed to maintain the U.S. public’s support for the men and women fighting the war and
keep them favorable to intervention per the New World Order, he focused on revitalizing
the patriotic spirit of America and reestablishing America's belief in its military through
its soldiers. Therefore, when anti-war protests began to rise due to the impending
invasion, people nationwide countered the anti-war protests by wrapping the U.S. in a
yellow ribbon from coast to coast.
People like Sybil Roberts, whose nephew was deployed in the Gulf, were
outraged at the anti-war protesters walking door to door asking for signatures to petition
the war. In protest to their protest, Roberts wrapped her entire porch in yellow ribbons
and even planted a sign in her front lawn that read on one side "We support the troops,”
and on the other, “Down with protesting.”236 Differing from previous uses of the yellow
ribbon, the use of it during the Gulf War took on an anti-protest agenda and equated antiwar protests to anti-soldier. Previously during the Vietnam War, the anti-war protest had
also evolved into anti-soldier and anti-veteran protests to less social backlash. Barbra
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Kone of Carline, New York expressed her concerns when she stated, "I don't want us to
get into the blame the soldier's problem that happened during Vietnam."237 Others like
Trish Shuh believed that one could “oppose the policy and still support the troops.”238
Whenever she attended an anti-war rally she pinned a yellow ribbon to her blouse in
support of her uncle and brother who were deployed in the Gulf. Her sentiment, however,
did not resonate with most Americans.
If the intention of demonstrations was not to stir the wrath of the majority
of Americans who, polls show, support the war, it didn't seem to work. ‘A lot of
callers are angry that we're reporting on the protests,’ said Jim McConnell, news
director of KGO news talk radio in San Francisco. ‘As soon as we do a report, we
get a half dozen calls right away.’239

In fact, most calls that came in were in favor of the war and were from folks who
wanted to express their pride and patriotism. According to Gil Gross, a radio host on
WOR in New York,
My calls today were 20-1 in favor of the war…it was amazing. Leading up
to the war, they were running 3-1 against. I’ve never seen such a turnaround so
fast. If the accents weren’t the same, I would have sworn I was in a different city,
doing a different show.240
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These testimonies lend evidence to the fact that by the conclusion of the Persian
Gulf War, the Bush administration was able to successfully alter the collective cultural
view of war back towards interventionism.
From his August 8th speech addressing the beginning of the Persian Gulf War to
his speech on February 27th addressing the conclusion of the war, President Bush focused
heavily on commemorating and supporting the men and women fighting overseas.
President Bush not only praised the commanding generals but also spoke highly of the
military as a whole, highlighting specific soldiers who had distinguished themselves
during the war. President Bush, for example, in an address before Congress on September
11, 1990, chose to address all three accounts stating,
At this moment, our brave servicemen and women stand watch in that
distant desert and on distant seas, side by side with the forces of more than 20
other nations. They are some of the finest men and women of the United States of
America. And they're doing one terrific job.241

He continued on to highlight a specific soldier,

Private First Class Wade Merritt of Knoxville, Tennessee, now stationed
in Saudi Arabia, wrote his parents of his worries, his love of family, and his hope
for peace. But Wade also wrote, "I am proud of my country and its firm stance
against inhumane aggression. I am proud of my army and its men. I am proud to
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serve my country." Well, let me just say, Wade, America is proud of you and is
grateful to every soldier, sailor, marine, and airman serving the cause of peace in
the Persian Gulf.242

President Bush ended this segment of his address by acknowledging his advisors
and generals:

I also want to thank the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Powell; the Chiefs here tonight; our commander in the Persian Gulf, General
Schwartzkopf; and the men and women of the Department of Defense. What a
magnificent job you all are doing. And thank you very, very much from a grateful
people.243

By speaking so highly and passionately about the U.S. military and all its
accomplishments and hard work, President Bush led by example to thank and appreciate
the soldiers and ranking officials. He encouraged citizens to embrace American
patriotism with open arms and reminded them to feel honor and pride in the U.S. military
and particularly its soldiers. This sense of national pride was lost during the Vietnam War
and in revitalizing the patriotic lifeline of the country, President Bush was able to get the
U.S. public to once again embrace their military and all its glory. Nothing embodied this
more than President Bush's declaration of the National Victory Celebration Military
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Parade.
On June 7th and 8th in 1991, President Bush along with Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell wanted to commemorate the victory of the Persian
Gulf War and the success of the New World Order with an extravagant welcome home
parade. Nearly 800,000 people crowded the nation’s capital for the welcome-homecelebration for the soldiers of Desert Storm.244 Covering multiple days, the event
continued as tens of thousands of people packed the mall to marvel at the high-tech
weaponry that won the war, set up picnics, and watch fireworks.245 This was a stark
difference from the Vietnam Memorial Ceremony where nearly no one attended. The
parade also fit neatly into President Bush’s World War II playbook. The National Victory
Celebration Military Parade bore close resemblance to the Victory Day Parade in 1946
declaring the end to World War II. Furthermore, by having all soldiers deployed and
returned home together, especially to a parade in their honor, the nation was able to easily
move past the war unlike the traumatizing post-Vietnam era. By supporting and
commemorating soldiers and the U.S. military in his rhetoric, along with the extravagant
show of victory with the National Victory Celebration Military Parade, President Bush
helped foster a nationwide sense of patriotism and support for the troops.
Throughout the post-Vietnam era, presidents worked adamantly to shake the
isolationist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome on the U.S. public, Congress, and U.S.
foreign policy. It was not until the success of the Persian Gulf War and the New World
Order that the Bush administration along with the U.S military were able to ‘kick’ the
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lasting effects of the Vietnam Syndrome and usher in a new era of global security.
Chapter Three Conclusion
President Bush understood that he and his administration needed to ‘kick’ the
Vietnam Syndrome since it prevented the U.S. from intervening in global conflicts,
especially in the developing world, and with the New World Order predicated on
coalition intervention, the Vietnam Syndrome would have to be ‘kicked' in order for it to
be successful. Therefore, as a means of defeating the lasting effects of the Vietnam
Syndrome, President Bush, his administration, and the U.S. military sold the Persian Gulf
War to the American people, Congress, and the UN by enhancing U.S. domestic policy
through a propaganda and media censorship campaign with the objective to rally public,
congressional, and international support for the Persian Gulf War, which, upon its
success, created a consensus on foreign policy to establish the New World Order and reestablish America’s faith and security abroad. President H.W. Bush along with General
Powell and the U.S. military played straight from the WWII playbook to remedy the
lingering mistakes of the Vietnam War in order to win the Persian Gulf War. The victory
not only restored America’s faith in Washington’s ability to effectively achieve national
security objectives and conduct military intervention abroad, it also reestablishing
America’s faith, pride, and support in its military, something that was greatly lost during
the post-Vietnam era. The Bush administration’s propaganda and military censorship
campaign effectively neutralized the lasting effects of the Vietnam Syndrome by shifting
the U.S. public’s collective cultural view of war back towards a policy of favoring
intervention within the framework of the New World Order.
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CONCLUSION
Throughout this thesis the argument has been made that the Vietnam Syndrome
had several distinguishable effects on not only the U.S. public, but also on foreign and
domestic policy decisions between 1975 and 1991. First, the Vietnam Syndrome had a
significant cultural effect on the American public which altered the country’s collective
cultural view of war from an interventionist to an anti-interventionist stance. Naturally,
this shift in public perception influenced U.S. presidents’ foreign and domestic policy
decisions from President Gerald Ford to President George H.W. Bush. Second, the
Vietnam Syndrome’s anti-interventionist effect challenged the established security of
containment policy through military intervention, forcing presidents and their
administrations to implement different rhetorical approaches and messages to unshackle,
in their view, America from the anti-interventionist effects of the Vietnam Syndrome on
foreign policy decisions. Third, as a means to defeat the lasting effects of the Vietnam
Syndrome, the Bush administration and the U.S. military enhanced U.S. domestic policy
through a multi-stage propaganda and media censorship campaign to rally public,
congressional, and international support for the Persian Gulf War; which, upon
America’s victory in the war, established the New World Order and re-established
America’s security abroad.
Moreover, this thesis addresses three specific research questions that are at the
core of this paper. First, what exactly is the Vietnam Syndrome and how did it affect the
U.S. public? Second, how did each post-Vietnam era president deal with the lasting
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effects of the Vietnam Syndrome? Lastly, how were President Bush and his
administration able to ‘kick’ the Vietnam Syndrome and establish a consensus on
interventionist foreign policy? While each of these questions examines a specific aspect
of the Vietnam Syndrome and its effects on America during the post-Vietnam era,
together, the corresponding answers frame a clear and concise evidence-based narrative
that the Vietnam Syndrome did, in fact, have a tangible hold on the U.S. public and
foreign and domestic policy during the post-Vietnam era. Each chapter of this thesis is
devoted to a corresponding research question above.
Chapter one attempted to explain the origin of the Vietnam Syndrome and its
effect on the U.S. public. The use of newspapers as well as scholarly sources helped
define the Vietnam Syndrome as the unwillingness of Americans and Congress to
intervene or involve America in the affairs of developing world countries. As described
in detail, there were a multitude of events that led to the creation of the Vietnam
Syndrome, and by clearly defining the Vietnam Syndrome, one can then examine its
isolationist influence on the U.S. public. The Vietnam Syndrome altered the collective
cultural view of war from an interventionist approach in foreign policy towards an
isolationist stance. Moreover, the Vietnam Syndrome further influenced society by
exposing the American dualist mentality within the country. On the one hand, America
flaunted its ideologies of freedom, humanitarianism, and the right to self-determination,
while on the other, it enforced the ideology of acting as the policeman of the world,
responsible for ensuring global security through intervention. It is important to
understand the effect of the Vietnam Syndrome on America because in a constitutional
federal republic, if the people rise in opposition and popular opinion falls out of favor,

135

completing foreign policy objectives like winning the Vietnam War, becomes difficult.
This dualist narrative was not only represented in the newspaper articles of the time but
also within the entertainment industry.
Following the dual narrative of the U.S. public, Hollywood mirrored the
sentiments of society by promoting both revisionist and realist narratives of the Vietnam
War. Revisionist films such as Rambo (1982, 1985, 1988) and Missing in Action (1984,
1985, 1988) attempted to rewrite the ‘losing’ narrative of the Vietnam War in order to
preserve the policeman ideology that kept the U.S. public in favor of an interventionist
foreign policy. In contrast, realist films such as Apocalypse Now (1979) and Platoon
(1986) represented the real trauma that the Vietnam War inflicted on the American
populace and the people of Southeast Asia, further illustrating the American dualist
ideology. This prompted the president at the time, Ronald Reagan, to personally endorse
the revisionist narrative of Rambo, due to the parallels drawn between Rambo and
Reagan, especially through President Reagan’s tough stance on communism. President
Reagan fully understood the influence of Hollywood on the U.S. public from his time as
president of the Screen Actors Guild where he and others adamantly fought to prevent the
presence of communist propaganda in Hollywood. By endorsing the revisionist narrative,
President Reagan’s rhetoric and actions either inadvertently or intentionally, helped
rewrite the damaging realist narrative of the Vietnam War in an effort to combat the
lasting effects of the Vietnam Syndrome, which was explored in greater detail in chapter
two.
Building on chapter one's question, chapter two sought to demonstrate how each
post-Vietnam era president attempted to defeat the lasting effects of the Vietnam
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Syndrome. Since the Vietnam Syndrome prevented post-Vietnam era presidents from
conducting foreign policy through an interventionist strategy, which was the preferred
way to defeat the spread of Soviet communism, each president used different rhetorical
messages to shift the cultural attitude of war back towards an interventionist policy and
unshackle the presidency from the limiting effects of the Vietnam Syndrome. As chapter
two reveals, President Ford, the first of the post-Vietnam era presidents, held the unique
position of serving as the first president who had to deal with the limiting effects of the
Vietnam Syndrome, which prompted his dual approach in his rhetoric. Through his
rhetoric, President Ford sought to present a strong front against the Soviet Union – one in
which America, though badly wounded from the Vietnam War, was not going to
relinquish its international duties as the policeman of the world. However, he also needed
to tread lightly to appease the general public and Congress who wanted to quit meddling
in world affairs, so his rhetoric concentrated on healing the wounds inflicted by the
Vietnam War. President Ford’s rhetoric spoke hollow words to most of America’s allies
including U.N. and NATO forces while focusing most of his rhetoric on addressing the
domestic wounds from Vietnam. President Ford's dual narrative approach failed to secure
him a second term however, and he lost the 1976 election to then-Senator Jimmy Carter’s
alluring message of peace.
Unlike President Ford’s dual message, President Carter sought to re-establish the
U.S. public, Congress, and the world’s faith in America as the peace brokers rather than
the policeman of the world. President Carter fulfilled his rhetorical promises by brokering
peace in the Middle East between Egypt and Israel in the 1978 Camp David Accords. By
re-branding America, President Carter re-established faith in the U.S. government's
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ability to conduct foreign policy in accordance with the moral, ethical, and ideological
principles established under Wilsonianism and the United Nations. President Carter's
rhetoric drastically helped re-alter the U.S public’s collective cultural view of war back
towards one open to the idea of intervention. Proving that the U.S. was capable of
brokering peace between warring nations demonstrated to the U.S. public and the world
that the U.S. was more than an imperialistic war machine. With faith restored in
America’s ability to conduct foreign policy, the American people elected a new president
with a new rhetorical message that once again resonated with the people – opposition to
the spread of communism.
Maintaining his well-established anti-communist sentiments, President Ronald
Reagan won the 1980 election largely due to his tough stance on communism and
through his objective to reinstate U.S. global dominance through intervention. President
Reagan’s rhetoric attempted to tackle the limiting effects that the Vietnam Syndrome
continued to hold on his administration’s ability to prevent the spread of Soviet
communism. However, the Reagan administration soon found themselves in the same
limiting situation as President Ford years earlier when they discovered their inability to
physically intervene and aid their allies due to the lingering presence of the Vietnam
Syndrome. That is why to shift the cultural view of war back towards intervention and
deliver on his campaign promises, President Reagan illegally side-stepped Congress and
disregarded the recently re-established Wilsonian image in order to support covert
operations against communist insurgencies in areas of Central America, Southeast Asia,
and the Middle East that were considered vital to national security. From America’s
involvement in the Soviet-Afghan War to the historical blunder of the Iran-Contra

138

Scandal, President Reagan proved throughout his two terms in office that he would never
hold the reputation of appearing weak in the face of communism. However, by the
conclusion of his two terms in office, residual effects of the Vietnam Syndrome remained
as seen by the lack of a Congressional consensus on interventionist policy.
The last of the post-Vietnam era presidents, President George H.W. Bush, held a
unique position reminiscent to that of President Ford. President Bush was praised for his
foreign policy relations with the Soviets as vice president of the Reagan administration,
however, by his first year in office, the Soviet Union had fallen, and the looming threat of
the Cold War had disappeared. With the Soviet Union no longer a threat to the U.S. it
appeared that global security through intervention could return. However, the fall of one
threat allowed for the rise of another, and in this case, it was the rise of Saddam Hussein
and the threat to global energy security in the Persian Gulf. Even with the fall of the
Soviet Union and the threat of Soviet retaliation no longer a concern, both the U.S. public
and Congress were still unwavering in their preference for isolationism with respect to
refraining from intervention in developing world conflicts. With the effects of the
Vietnam Syndrome still lingering, President Bush used the rhetorical message of the New
World Order to rally support for intervention and re-alter America’s collective cultural
view of war.
Combining the collective security and self-determination ideology of the League
of Nations with the humanitarian and international laws of the U.N., President Bush
established the New World Order. The best of both global organizations and the teeth of
collective security backed by the humanitarian rule of law perfectly reflected the
American dualist ideology. On January 12, 1991, President H.W. Bush's rhetoric proved
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successful and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution was
passed by a minor majority. Congress, along with the backing of the U.N. and the U.S.
public, voted to allow the Bush administration complete freedom to re-establish the
sovereign and legitimate government of Kuwait and secure the flow of oil from the Gulf,
and less than a month later, President Bush announced he had instructed the U.S. military
to intervene in the Gulf.
Chapter three aimed to examine more closely how President Bush managed to
‘kick’ the Vietnam Syndrome and create a consensus within Congress on foreign policy
objectives. It is clear throughout chapter two that each post-Vietnam president had to deal
with the limiting effects of Vietnam Syndrome to varying degrees. President Reagan
arguably experienced the most limitations due to his overtly interventionist agenda, but
despite his efforts, even he could not gain the full support of the U.S. public or Congress
due to the continued influence of the Vietnam Syndrome. So, how did President Bush
manage?
The Bush administration, along with the U.S. military was able to ‘kick’ the
Vietnam Syndrome and provide a consensus on foreign policy through the New World
Order by successfully selling the Persian Gulf War to the American people, Congress,
and the U.N. after enhancing U.S. domestic policy through a propaganda and media
censorship campaign, which upon its success, effectively re-established America’s faith
in its military and its security abroad. Furthermore, President Bush along with General
Powell implemented strategies straight from the WWII playbook that avoided the
mistakes of the Vietnam War to win the Persian Gulf War. His successful propaganda
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and military censorship campaign helped ensure America’s victory in the Gulf, and the
re-establishment of global security with the U.S. at the helm.
The following implications can be drawn from the research provided within this
thesis. It is not enough for the U.S. public to protest military intervention by relying on
the Vietnam Syndrome and expect that their efforts will continue to prevent the U.S.
government from enacting interventionist policy. If they are to ensure that their
government does not fall prey to imperial excesses and anti-democratic tendencies, they
must educate itself and promote awareness of the professional realm of politics in order
to understand the reasoning for realpolitik methods behind foreign diplomacy decisions.
Presidents and their administrations not only have their own agendas and objectives that
they want to accomplish as president, but they typically represent larger political
strategies, like containment policy, that must also be considered when forming and
implementing policy. Between their personal agenda, their party’s agenda, and their
constituent’s agenda, the interests of the U.S. public can, and usually does, get pushed
aside. With more education on the realities of the American professional political system,
however, the American populace could more readily fight for their interests instead of
trusting completely in their elected officials.
Furthermore, the U.S. public must enter the profession realm of politics for the
effects of the Vietnam Syndrome to diminish over time. As shown in this thesis, from
President Ford to President Bush, each used strategic rhetorical messages to challenge the
Vietnam Syndrome and persuade the American populace back towards a favorable view
of interventionist policy per containment policy. Instead of relying on protests of public
opinion which fade over time, the U.S. public instead should educate themselves in the
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realm of modern professional politics to better compete or protect their interests against
the tides of time and the interests of the parties. Education in the realm of modern
professional politics leads to greater resistance to manipulation and propaganda like in
the case of the Persian Gulf War. If the U.S. public would not have relied on the
continued isolating effects of the Vietnam Syndrome they could have more effectively
challenged President Bush’s propaganda campaign and recognized that the Persian Gulf
War was less about recognizing and opposing the new personification of Hitler and more
about securing America’s regional stability, energy, and economic interests abroad. The
American people must value educating themselves on the intricacies of the modern
political system or else resign themselves to its very whim.
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